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
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AN ESSAY

IN

REFUTATION OF ATHEISM

BY

O. A. BROWNSON.

EDITED BY

HENRY F. BROWNSON.

DETROIT:
THORNDIKE NOURSE.
1882.

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE.
INTRODUCTION.....	1
THEISM IN POSSESSION.....	4
THE ATHEIST CANNOT TURN THE PRESUMPTION.....	9
NO PURELY COSMIC SCIENCE.....	13
THEOLOGIANS AND THE SCIENTISTS.....	24
INCONCLUSIVE PROOFS.....	32
ANALYSIS OF THOUGHT.....	40
ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECT.....	46
ANALYSIS OF THE IDEAL.....	56
ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION....	62
THE FACT OF CREATION.....	67
EXISTENCES.....	76
GOD AS FINAL CAUSE.....	81
OBLIGATION OF WORSHIP.....	88
TRADITION.....	94

PREFACE

TO

AN ESSAY IN REFUTATION OF ATHEISM.

It is not without some misgiving that I present the following essay to the public; not, indeed, because I have any lack of confidence in the soundness of its principles, or the combined analytical and synthetic processes by which I attempt to demonstrate the existence of God, the fact of creation, providence, the moral law, and the ground of man's moral obligation to worship God; but from a consciousness of my inability to do justice to the great thesis I have undertaken to defend, and my distrust of the disposition of the public to receive and read with patience what is most likely to be treated as a metaphysical disquisition, and therefore as worthless. Nobody now reads metaphysical works, or any works that pertain to the higher philosophy, and especially such as attempt to vindicate theology as the science of sciences.

All I can say is, that my essay is not metaphysical in the ordinary acceptation of the term, does not attempt to construct a science of abstractions, which are null, and deals only with concretes, with realities. Some of the problems, and the analyses by which I attempt to solve them, may be regarded as abstruse, difficult, and foreign from the ordinary current of thought, as all such discussions must necessarily be; but I have done my best to make my statements and reasonings clear and distinct, plain and intelligible to men of ordinary understanding and intellectual culture.

The greatest difficulty the reader will find arises from the fact that I have not followed the more common methods of proving the existence of God, and that while I have broached no new system of philosophy, I have adopted an unfamiliar method of demonstration, though in my judgment rendered necessary by the logic of the case. I follow neither the ontological method, nor the psychological method, and adopt neither the argument *a priori*, nor the *argument a posteriori*, and while I maintain that the principles of all the real and the knowable are intuitively given I deny that we know that being or God is by intuition.

I have borrowed from Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, from Cousin and Gioberti, heathen and Christian, orthodox and heterodox what I found to my purpose, but I follow no one any further than he follows what I hold to be demonstrable or undeniable truth. I have freely criticized and rejected the teachings of eminent authors, for some of whom I have a profound reverence, but I think my criticisms carry their own justification with them. I have adopted the Ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, asserted by Gioberti; but not till I have by my own analysis of thought, the objective element of thought, and the ideal element of the object, been forced to accept it; and whether I explain and apply it or not in his sense, I certainly take it in none of the senses that, to my knowledge, have been objected to by his critics. I am not a follower of Gioberti; he is not my master; but I cannot reject a truth because he has defended it; and to refuse to name him, and give him credit where credit is honestly his due, because he is in bad odor with a portion of the public, would be an act of meanness and cowardice of which I trust I am incapable.

My essay ought to be acceptable to all who profess to be Christians. What my religion is all the world knows that knows me at all. I am an uncompromising Catholic, and on all proper occasions I glory in avowing my adherence to the See of Rome, and in defending the Catholic faith, and the Roman Pontiff now gloriously reigning, the Vicar of Christ, and Supreme Head and infallible teacher of the Universal Church. Such being the fact, there would be a want of good taste as well as

manliness in seeking to disguise or to conceal it. But in this work I have had no occasion to discuss any question on which there are any differences among those who profess to be Christians, and I have only defended, not the faith, but the preamble to faith, as St. Thomas calls it, against the common enemy of God and man.

I have embodied in this comparatively brief essay the results of my reading and reflections during a long life on the grounds of science, religion, and ethics; they may not be worth much, but I give them to the public for what they are worth. They do not solve all the questions that the ingenious and the subtle critic may raise, and fairly respond to all the objections that sophists and cavillers may adduce; but I think the work indicates a method which will be useful to many minds, and, if it converts no atheist, will at least tend to confirm Christians in the fundamental article of their faith, and to put them on their guard against the seductions of a satanic philosophy and a false, but arrogant science to which they are everywhere exposed. I have written to save the cause of truth and sound philosophy, and, in all humility, I submit what I have written to the protection of Him whose honor and glory I have wished to serve, and to the infallible judgment of his Vicar on earth.

O. A. BROWNSON.

ELIZABETH, N. J., March, 1872.

ESSAY IN REFUTATION OF ATHEISM.

[From Brownson's Quarterly Review for 1873-4.]

I.—INTRODUCTION.

THE age of heresy is virtually past. Heresy, in its progressive developments, has successively arraigned and rejected every article in the creed, from "Patrem omnipotentem" down to "Vitam æternam." Following its essential nature, that of arbitrary choice among revealed mysteries and dogmas, of what it will reject or retain, it has eliminated one after another, till it has nothing distinctively Christian remaining, or to distinguish it from pure, unmitigated rationalism and downright naturalism. It retains with the men and women of the advanced, or movement party, hardly a dim and fading reminiscence of the supernatural, and may be said to have exhausted itself, and gone so far that it can go no further.

No new heresy is possible. The pressing, the living controversy of the day is not between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, which virtually ended with Bossuet's *Histoire des Variations du Protestantisme*, and the issue is now between Christianity and infidelity, faith and unbelief, religion and no religion, the worship of God the Creator, or the idolatry of man and nature—in a word between theism and atheism; for pantheism, so fearfully prevalent in modern philosophy, is only a form of atheism, and in substance differs not from what the fool says in his heart, *Non est Deus*. Not all on either side, however, have as yet become aware that this is the real issue, or that the old controversy between the orthodox and the heterodox, or the church and the sects, is not still a living controversy; but all on either side who have looked beneath the surface, and marked the tendencies of modern thought and of modern theories widely received, in their principles if not in their developments, are well aware that the exact question at issue is no longer the church, but back of it in the domain of science and philosophy, and is simply, God or no God?

The scientific theories in vogue are all atheistic, or have at least an atheistic tendency; for they all seek to explain

man and the universe, or the cosmos, without the recognition of God as its first or its final cause. Even the philosophical systems that professedly combat atheism and materialism, fail to recognize the fact of creation from nothing, assume the production of the cosmos by way of emanation, formation, or evolution, which is only a form of atheism. Even philosophical theories which profess to demonstrate the existence of God, bind him fast or completely hedge him in by what they call "the laws of nature," deny him personality or the last complement of rational nature, and take from him his liberty or freedom of action, which is really to deny him, or, what is the same thing, to absorb him in the cosmos.

The ethical theories of our moral philosophers have equally an atheistical tendency. They all seek a basis for virtue without the recognition of God, the creative act, or the divine will. Some place the ethical principle in self-interest, some in utility, some in instinct, some in what they call a moral sense, a moral sentiment, or in a subjective idea; others, in acting according to truth; others, in acting according to the fitness of things, or in reference to universal order. Popular literature, written or inspired in no small part by women, places it in what it calls love, and in doing what love dictates. The love, however, is instinctive, carries its own reason and justification in itself, refuses to be morally bound, and shrinks from the very thought of duty or obligation—a love that moves and operates as one of the great elemental forces of nature, as attraction, gravitation, the wind, the storm, or the lightning. The Christian doctrine that makes virtue consist in voluntary obedience to the law of God as our sovereign, our final cause, and finds the basis of moral obligation in our relation to God as his creatures, created for him as their last end, is hardly entertained by any class of modern ethical philosophers, even when they profess to be Christians.

In politics, the same tendency to eliminate God from society and the state is unmistakable. The statesmen and political philosophers who base their politics on principles derived from theology are exceptions to the rule, and are regarded as "behind the age." Political atheism, or the assumption that the secular order is independent of the spiritual, and can and should exist and act without regard to it, is the popular doctrine throughout Europe and America, alike with monarchists and republicans, and is at the bot-

tom of all the revolutionary movements of the last century and the present. Nothing can be said that will be received with more general repugnance by the men of the age than the assertion of the supremacy of the spiritual order, or the denial that the secular is independent,—supreme.

If we glance at the various projects of reform, moral, political, or social, which are put forth from day to day in such numbers and with so much confidence, we shall see that they are all pervaded by one and the same atheistic thought. We see it in the late Robert Owen's scheme of parallelograms, which avowedly assumed that the race had hitherto been afflicted by a trinity of evils of which it is necessary to get rid, namely, property, marriage, and religion; we see it in the phalanstery of Charles Fourier, based on passional harmony, or rather on passional indulgence; we see it also in the International Association of working men, who would seem to be moved by a personal hatred of God; finally, we see it in the mystic republic of the late Mazzini, who though he accepts, in name, God and religion, yet makes the people God, and popular instincts religion. The Saint-Simonians, with their *Nouveau Christianisme*, are decidedly pantheists, and the Comtists recognize and worship no God but the grand collective being, humanity; Proudhon declared that we must deny God, or not be able to assert liberty.

This rapid sketch is sufficient to bear out the statement that the living controversy of the day is not between orthodox and heterodox Christians, but between Christianity and atheism, or, what is the same thing, Christianity and pantheism. The battle is not even for supernatural revelation, but for God, the Creator and End of man and the universe, for natural reason and natural society, for the very principle of intellectual, moral, and social life. It is all very well for those excellent people who never look beyond their own convictions or prejudices to tell us that atheism is absurd, and that we need not trouble ourselves about it, for no man in his senses is, or can be, an atheist. But let no one lay this "flattering unction to his soul." Facts, too painfully certain to be disputed, and too numerous to be unheeded by any one who attends at all to what is going on under his very eyes, prove the contrary. The fools are not all dead, and a new crop is born every year.

The Internationals are avowed atheists, and they boast that their association, which is but of yesterday, has already

(1871) two millions of men in France enrolled in its ranks, and four millions in the rest of Europe. Is this nothing? What their principles are, and what their conduct may be expected to be, the murders and incendiarisms of the Paris Commune, which their chiefs approved, have sufficiently taught us. But, under the guise of science and free thought, men of the highest intellectual, literary, and social standing, like Ralph Waldo Emerson and his disciples, like Charles Darwin, Sir John Lubbock, Professors Huxley and Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, Emile Littré, and the Positivists or worshippers of humanity, to say nothing of the Hegelians of Germany and the majority of the medical profession, are daily and hourly propagating atheism, open or disguised, in our higher literary and cultivated classes. The ablest and most approved organs of public opinion in Great Britain and the United States, France and Germany, either defend atheistic science, or treat its advocates with great respect and tenderness, as if the questions they raise were purely speculative, and without any practical bearing on the great and vital interests of man and society. There may be, and we trust there is, much faith, much true piety left in Christendom; but public opinion, we may say the official opinion,—the opinion that finds expression in nearly all modern governments and legislation,—is antichristian, and between Christianity and atheism there is no middle ground, no legitimate halting place.

It certainly, then, is not a work uncalled for, to subject the atheistic and false theistic theories of the day to a brief but rigid examination. The problem we have to solve is the gravest problem that can occupy the human intellect or the human heart, the individual or society. It is, whether there is a God who has created the world from nothing, who is our first cause and our last cause, who has made us for himself as our supreme good, who sustains and governs us by his providence, and has the right to our obedience and worship; or whether we are in the world, coming we know not whence, and going we know not whither, without any rule of life or purpose in our existence.

II.—THEISM IN POSSESSION.

An atheist is one who is not a theist. Atheists may be divided into two classes, positive and negative. Positive atheists are those who deny positively the existence of God,

and profess to be able to prove that God is not; negative atheists are those, who, if they do not deny positively that God is, maintain that he is unknowable, that we have, and can have no proof of his existence, no reason for asserting it, for the hypothesis of a God explains and accounts for nothing. Of this latter class of atheists are the Comtists and the Cosmists, or those who take Auguste Comte for their master and those who swear by Herbert Spencer.

False theists or pantheists reject the name of atheists, and yet are not essentially distinguishable from them. They are divided into several classes: 1, the emanationists, or those who hold that all things emanate, as the stream from the fountain, from the one only being or substance which they call God, and return at length to him and are reabsorbed in him; 2, the generationists, or those who hold that the one only being or substance is in itself both male and female, and generates the world from itself; 3, the formationists, or those who, like Plato and Aristotle, hold that God produces all things by giving form to a preëxisting and eternal matter, as an artificer constructs a house or a temple with materials furnished to his hand; 4, the ontologists, or Spinozists, who assert that nothing is or exists, but being or substance, with its attributes or modes; 5, the psychologists or egoists, or those who assert that nothing exists but the soul, the Ego, and its productions, modes, or affections, as maintained by Fichte.

There are various other shades of pantheism; but all pantheists coalesce and agree in denying the creative act of being producing all things from nothing, and all, except the formationists, represented by Plato and Aristotle, agree in maintaining that there is only one substance, and that the cosmos emanates from it, is generated by it, or is its attribute, mode, affection, or phenomenon. The characteristic of pantheism is the denial of creation from nothing and the creation of substantial existences or second causes, that is, existences capable, when sustained by the first cause, of acting from their own centre and producing effects of their own. Plato and Aristotle approach nearer to theism than any other class of pantheists, and if they had admitted creation they would not be pantheists at all, but theists.

Omitting the philosophers of the Academy and the Lyceum, all pantheists admit only one substance, which is the substance or reality of the cosmos, on which all the cosmic phenomena depend for their reality, and of which they are

simply appearances or manifestations. Here pantheism and atheism coincide, and are one and the same; for whether you call this one substance God, soul, or nature, makes not the least difference in the world, since you assert nothing above or distinguishable from the cosmos. Pantheism may be the more subtle form, but is none the less a form of atheism, and pantheists are really only atheists; for they assert no God distinct from nature, above it, and its creator.

Pantheism is the earliest form of atheism, the first departure from theology, and is not regarded by those who accept it as atheism at all. It undoubtedly retains many theistical conceptions around which the religious sentiments may linger for a time; yet it is no-theism and no-theism is atheism. Pantheism, if one pleases, is inchoate atheism, the first step in the descent from theism, as complete atheism is the last. It is the germ of which atheism is the blossom or the ripe fruit. Pantheism is a misconception of the relation of cause and effect, and the beginning of the corruption of the ideal; atheism is its total corruption and loss. It is implicit not explicit atheism, as every heresy is implicitly though not explicitly the total denial of Christianity, since Christianity is an indivisible whole. In this sense, and in this sense only, are pantheism and atheism distinguishable.

Pantheism in some of its forms underlies all the ancient and modern heathen mythologies; and nothing is more absurd than to suppose that these mythologies were primitive, and that Christianity has been gradually developed from them. Men could not deny God before his existence had been asserted, nor could they identify him with the substance or reality manifested in the cosmic phenomena if they had no notion of his existence. Pantheism and atheism presuppose theism; for the denial cannot precede the affirmation, and either is unintelligible without it, as Protestantism presupposes and is unintelligible without the church in communion with the See of Rome against which it protests. The assertion of the papal supremacy necessarily preceded its denial. Dr. Draper, Sir John Lubbock, as well as a host of others, maintain that the more perfect forms of religion have been developed from the less perfect, as Professor Huxley maintains that life is developed from protoplasm, and protoplasm from proteine, and Charles Darwin that the higher species of animals have been developed from the lower, man from the ape or some one of the monkey tribe, by the gradual operation for ages of what he calls "natural selection."

It has almost passed into an axiom that the human race began, as to religion, in fetichism, and passed progressively through the various forms and stages of polytheism up to the sublime monotheism of the Jews and Christians; yet the only authority for it is that it chimes in with the general theory of progress held by a class of antichristian theorists and socialists, but which has itself no basis in science, history, or philosophy. So far as history goes, the monotheism of the Jews and Christians is older than polytheism, older than fetichism, and in fact, as held by the patriarchs, was the primitive religion of mankind. There is no earlier historical record extant than *Genesis*, and in that we find the recognition and worship of one only God, Creator of the heavens and the earth, as well established as subsequently with the Jews and Christians. The oldest of the Vedas are the least corrupt and superstitions of the sacred books of the Hindoos, but the theology even of the oldest and purest is decidedly pantheistic, which as we have said, presupposes theism, and never could have preceded the theistical theology. Pantheism may be developed by way of corruption from theism, but theism can never be developed in any sense from pantheism.

All the Gentile religions or superstitions, if carefully examined and scientifically analyzed, are seen to have their type in the patriarchal religion,—the type, be it understood, from which they have receded, but not the ideal which they are approaching and struggling to realize. They all have their ideal in the past, and each points to a perfection once possessed, but now lost. Over them all hovers the memory of a departed glory. The genii, devs, or divi, the good and the bad demons of the heathen mythologies, are evidently travesties of the Biblical doctrine of good and bad angels. The doctrine of the fall, of expiation and reparation by the suffering and death of a God or Divine Person, which meets us under various forms in all the Indo-Germanic or Aryan mythologies, and indeed in all the known mythologies of the world, are evidently derived from the teachings of the patriarchal or primitive religion of the race,—not the Christian doctrine of original sin, redemption, and reparation by the passion and death of Our Lord, from them. The heathen doctrines on all these points are mingled with too many silly fables, too many superstitious details and revolting and indecent incidents, to have been primitive, and clearly prove that they are a primitive doc-

trine corrupted. The purest and simplest forms are always the earliest.

We see, also, in all these heathen mythologies, traces or reminiscences of an original belief in the unity of God. Above all the Dii Majores and the Dii Minores there hovers, so to speak, dimly and indistinctly it may be, one supreme and ever-living God, to whom Saturn, Jupiter, Juno, Venus, Vulcan, Mars, Dis, and all the other gods and goddesses to whom temples were erected and sacrifices were offered, were inferior and subject. It is true the heathen regarded him as inaccessible and inexorable; paid him no distinctive worship, and denominated him Fate or Destiny; yet it is clear that in the *τό εἶν* of the Alexandrians, the Eternity of the Persians, above both Ormuzd and Ahriman, the heathen retained at least an obscure and fading reminiscence of the unity and supremacy of the one God of tradition. They knew him, but they did not, when they knew him, worship him as God, but gave his glory unto creatures or empty idols.

We deny, then, that fetichism or any other form of heathenism is or can be the primitive or earliest religion of mankind. The primitive or earliest known religion of mankind was a purely theistical religion. Monotheism is, historically as well as logically, older than polytheism; the worship of God preceded the worship of nature, the elements, the sun, moon, and stars of heaven, or the demons swarming in the air. Christian faith is in substance older than pantheism, as pantheism is older than undisguised atheism. Christian theism is the oldest creed, as well as the oldest philosophy of mankind, and has been from the first and still is the creed of the living and progressive portion of the human race.

Christianity claims, as every body knows, to be the primitive and universal religion, and to be based on absolutely catholic principles. Always and everywhere held, though not held by all individuals, or even nations, free from all admixture of error and superstition. Yet analyze all the heathen religions, eliminate all their differences, as Mr. Herbert Spencer proposes, take what is positive or affirmative, permanent, universal, in them, as distinguished from what in them is negative, limited, local, variable, or transitory, and you will have remaining the principles of Christianity as found in the patriarchal religion, as held in the Synagogue, and taught by the Church of Christ. These

principles are all absolutely catholic or universal, and hence Christianity, in its essential principles at least, is really the universal religion, and in possession as such. The presumption, as say the lawyers, is then decidedly in favor of the Christian and against the atheist.

Christianity, again, not only asserts God and his providence as its fundamental principle, but claims to be the law of God, supernaturally revealed to man, or the revelation which he has made of himself, of his providence, of his will, and of what he exacts of his rational creatures. Then, again, Christianity asserts, in principle, only the catholic or universal belief of the race. The belief in God, in providence, natural power, and in supernatural intervention in human affairs in some form, is universal. Even the atheist shudders at a ghost story, and is surprised by sudden danger into a prayer. Men and nations may in their ignorance or superstition misconceive and misrepresent the Divinity, but they could not do so, if they had no belief that God is. Prayer to God or the gods, which is universal, is full proof of the universality of the belief in Divine Providence and in supernatural intervention. Hence, again, the presumption is in favor of Christian theism and against the atheist.

Of course, this universal belief, or this *consensus hominum*, is not adduced here as full proof of the truth of Christianity, or of the catholic principles on which it rests; but it is adduced as a presumptive proof of Christianity and against atheism, while it undeniably throws the burden of proof on the atheist, or whoever questions it. It is not enough for the atheist to deny God, providence, and the supernatural; he must sustain his denial by proofs strong enough, at least, to turn the presumption against Christianity, before he can oblige or compel the Christian to plead. Till then, "So I and my fathers have always held," is all the reply he is required to make to any one that would oust him.

III.—THE ATHEIST CANNOT TURN THE PRESUMPTION.

But can the atheist turn the presumption, and turn it against the theist? It perhaps will be more difficult to do it than he imagines. It is very easy to say that the universal fact which the Christian adduces originated in ignorance, which the progress of science has dissipated; but this is not enough: the atheist must prove that it has actually originated in men's ignorance, and not in their knowledge, and

that the alleged progress of science, so far as it bears on this question, is not itself an illusion; for he must bear in mind that the burden of proof rests on him, since theism is in possession and the presumption is against him. Is it certain that Christians have less science than atheists? As far as our observation goes, the atheist may have more of theory and be richer in bold denials and in unsupported assertions, but he has somewhat less of science than the Christian theologian. The alleged progress of science, be it greater or less, throws no light one way or another on the question; for it is confessedly confined to a region below that of religion, and does not rise above or extend beyond the cosmos.

The latest and ablest representatives of the atheistical science of the age are the Positivists, or followers of Auguste Comte, and the Cosmists, or admirers of Herbert Spencer, and neither of these pretend that their science has demonstrated or can demonstrate that God is not. Mr. John Fiske, who last year (1870) was a Comtist, and who is this year (1871) a Cosmist says, in one of his lectures before Harvard College, very distinctly, that they have not. He says, speaking of God and religion: "We are now in a region where absolute demonstration, in the *scientific* sense, is impossible. It is beyond the power of science to prove that a personal God either exists or does *not exist*." This is express, and is not affected by the interjection of the word *personal*, for an impersonal God is no God at all, but is simply nature or the cosmos, and indistinguishable from it. The lecturer, after admitting the inability of science to prove there is no God, proceeds to criticise the arguments usually adduced to prove that God is, and to show that they are all inconclusive. Suppose him successful in this, which, by the way, he is not, he proves nothing to the purpose. The insufficiency of the arguments alleged to prove that God is, does not entitle him to conclude that God is not, and creates no presumption that he is not. He cannot conclude from their insufficiency that science is capable of overcoming the great fact the Christian adduces, and which creates presumption against atheism.

It is, no doubt, true, that both the Comtists and Cosmists deny that they are atheists; but they are evidently what we have called negative atheists; for they do not assert that God is, and maintain that there is no evidence or proof of his existence. If they do not positively deny it, they certainly do not affirm it. They admit, indeed, an infinite power, Force, or Reality, underlying the cosmic phenomena,

and of which the phenomena are manifestations; but this does not relieve them of atheism, for it is not independent of the cosmos or distinguishable from it. It is simply the cosmos itself—the substance or reality—that appears in the cosmic phenomena. It, then, is not God, and they do not call it God, and avowedly reject what they call the “theistical hypothesis.”

Yet both sects agree in this, that they have no science that disproves the “theistical hypothesis,” or that does or can prove the falsity of the great catholic principles asserted in the universal beliefs of the race. Mr. Fiske, in his lecture, says: “We cannot therefore expect to obtain a result which, like a mathematical theorem, shall stand firm through mere weight of logic, or which, like a theorem in physics, can be subjected to a crucial test. We can only examine the arguments on which the theistic hypothesis is founded, and inquire whether they are of such a character as to be convincing and satisfactory If it turns out that these arguments are not . . . satisfactory, it will follow that, as the cosmic philosophy becomes more and more widely understood and accepted, the theistical hypothesis will generally fall into discredit, not because it will have been disproved but because there will be no sufficient warrant for maintaining it.” This is a full and frank confession that science does not and cannot disprove Christian theism, and that the hope of the Cosmists to get it superseded by the cosmic philosophy, does not rest on disproving it, but in persuading men that there “is no sufficient warrant for maintaining it.” But, if science cannot disprove theism, the presumption remains good against atheism, and the Christian theist is not required to produce his title deeds or proofs. Till then, the argument from prescription or possession is all the warrant he needs.

But the confession that science cannot prove that God is not, is the confession that the atheist has no scientific truth to oppose Christian theism, but only a theory, an opinion, a “mental habit,” without any scientific support. In the passage last quoted from Mr. Fiske we have marked an omission. The part of the sentence omitted is, “none who rigidly adhere to the doctrine of evolution, who assert the relativity of all knowledge, and who refuse to reason on the subjective method.” There can be no doubt that the doctrine of evolution and the relativity of all knowledge is incompatible, as Mr. Fiske and his master, Herbert Spencer,

maintain, with Christian theism, or the assertion that God is. But as science cannot prove that God is not, it follows that the doctrine of evolution and the relativity of all knowledge, which the Cosmists oppose to the existence of God, is not and cannot be scientifically proved, and is simply a theory or hypothesis, not science, and counts for nothing in the argument. In confessing their inability to demonstrate what the fool says in his heart, *NON EST DEUS*, God is not, they confess their inability to demonstrate their doctrine of evolution, and the relativity of all knowledge. They also thus confess that they have no science to oppose theism, and they expect it to perish, in the words of Mr. Fiske, "as other doctrines have perished, through lack of the mental predisposition to accept it." This should dispose of the objection to Christian theism drawn from pretended science, and it leaves the presumption still against atheism, as we have found it.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the presumption in favor of theism cannot be overcome, and the burden of proof thrown on the theist by any alleged theory or hypothesis which is not itself demonstrated or proved. The atheist must prove that his theory or hypothesis is scientifically true, which of course the cosmic philosophers, who assert the theory of evolution and of the relativity of all knowledge, cannot do. If all knowledge is relative, there is then no absolute knowledge; if no absolute knowledge, the Cosmists can neither absolutely know nor prove that all knowledge is relative. The proof of the theory of the relativity of all knowledge would consequently be its refutation; for then all knowledge would not be relative, to wit, the knowledge that all knowledge is relative. The theory is then self-contradictory, or an unprovable and an uncertain opinion; and an uncertain opinion is insufficient to oust theism from its immemorial possession. The atheist must allege against it positive truth, or facts susceptible of being positively proved, or gain no standing in court.

According to the Cosmists, there is no absolute science, and science itself is a variable and uncertain thing. Mr. Fiske tells us that in 1870 he was a Comtist or Positivist, and defended, in his course of lectures of that year, the "Philosophic Positive;" but in this year (1871) he holds and defends the cosmic philosophy, which he says "differs from it almost fundamentally." The Comtean philosophy absorbs the cosmos in man and society; the cosmic philosophy

includes man and society in the cosmos, as it does minerals, vegetables, animals, apes and tadpoles, and subjects them all alike to one and the same universal law of evolution. This, our cosmic or Spencerian philosopher assures us, is science to-day. But who can say "what it will be fifty years hence, or what modifications of it the unremitted investigations of scientific men into the cosmic phenomena and their laws will necessitate." There is and can be no real, invariable, and permanent science, yet the cosmic philosophers see no absurdity in asking the race to give up its universal beliefs on the authority of their present theory, and nothing wrong in trying to spread their ever-shifting, ever-varying science and make it supersede in men's minds the Christian principles of God, creation, and providence, although they confess that it may turn out on inquiry to be false.

There is no doubt that, if the cosmic philosophers could get their pretended science generally accepted, they would do much to generate a habit or disposition of mind very unfavorable to the recognition of Christian theism; but that would be no argument for the truth of their science or philosophy. The Cosmists—a polite name for atheists—fail to recognize theism, not because they have or pretend to have any scientific evidence of its falsity, but really because it does not lie in the sphere of their investigations. "I have never seen God at the end of my telescope," said the astronomer, Lalande; yet perhaps it never occurred to him that if there were no God, there could be no astronomy. The Cosmists confine their investigations to the cosmic phenomena and their laws, and God is neither a cosmic phenomenon nor a cosmic law; how then should they recognize him? They do not find God, because he is not in the order of facts with which they are engrossed, though not one of those facts does or could exist without him.

IV. NO PURELY COSMIC SCIENCE.

Theism being in possession, and holding from prescription, can be ousted only by establishing the title of an adverse claimant. This, we have seen, the atheist cannot do. The cosmic philosophers confess that science is unable to prove that God is not. They confess, then, that they have no scientific truth to oppose to his being, or that contradicts it. It is true, they add, that science is equally unable to prove that God is; but that is our affair, and per-

haps we shall, before we close, prove the contrary. But it is enough for us at present to know that the Cosmists or atheists confess that they have no scientific truth that proves that God is not.

Indeed they do not propose to get rid of Christian theism by disproving it, or by proving their atheism, but by turning away the mind from its contemplation, and generating in the community habits of mind adverse to its reception. Take the following extract from one of Mr. Fiske's lectures in proof:

"It is, indeed, generally true that theories concerning the supernatural perish, not from extraneous violence, but from inanition. The belief in witchcraft, or the physical intervention of the devil in human affairs, is now laughed at; yet two centuries have hardly elapsed since it was held by learned and sensible men, as an essential part of Christianity. It was supported by an immense amount of testimony which no one has ever refuted in detail. No one has ever disproved witchcraft, as Young disproved the corpuscular theory of light. But the belief has died out because scientific cultivation has rendered *the mental soil unfit for it*. The contemporaries of Bodin were so thoroughly predisposed by their general theory of things to believe in the continual intervention of the devil, that it needed but the slightest evidence to make them credit any particular act of intervention. But to the educated men of to-day such intervention seems too improbable to be admitted on any amount of testimony. The hypothesis of diabolic interference is simply ruled out, and will remain ruled out.

"So with Spiritualism (spiritism), the modern form of totemism, or the belief in the physical intervention of the souls of the dead in human affairs. Men of science decline to waste their time in arguing against it, because they know that the only way in which to destroy it is to educate people in science. Spiritualism (spiritism) is simply one of the weeds which spring up in minds uncultivated by science. There is no use in pulling up one form of the superstition by the roots, for another form, equally noxious, is sure to take root; the only way of insuring the destruction of the pests is to sow the seeds of scientific truth. When, therefore, we are gravely told what persons of undoubted veracity have seen, we are affected about as if a friend should come in and assure us upon his honor as a gentleman that heat is not a mode of motion.

"The case is the same with the belief in miracles, or the physical intervention of the Deity in human affairs. To the theologian such intervention is *a priori* so probable that he needs but slight historic testimony to make him believe in it. To the scientific thinker it is *a priori* so improbable, that no amount of historic testimony, such as can be produced, suffices to make him entertain the hypothesis for an instant. Hence it is that such critics as Strauss and Renan, to the great disgust of theo-

gians, always assume, prior to argument, that miraculous narratives are legendary. Hence it is that when the slowly dying belief in miracles finally perishes, it will not be because any one will ever have refuted it by an array of syllogisms—the syllogisms of the theologian and those of the scientist have no convincing power as against each other, because neither accepts the major premise of the other—but it will be because the belief is discordant with the *mental habits induced* by the general study of science.

“Hence it is that the cosmic philosopher is averse to proselytism, and has no sympathy with radicalism or infidelity. For he knows that the theological habits of thought are relatively useful, while scepticism, if permanent, is intellectually and morally pernicious; witness the curious fact that radicals are prone to adopt retrograde social theories. Knowing this, he knows that the only way to destroy theological habits of thought without detriment is to nurture scientific habits—which stifle the former as surely as clover stifles weeds.”

A more apt illustration would have been, “as sure as the weeds stifle the corn.” But it is evident from this extract that the cosmic philosophers are aware of their inability to overthrow Christian theism by any direct proof, or by any truth, scientifically verifiable, opposed to it. They trust to what in military parlance might be called “a flank movement.” They aim to turn the impregnable position of the theist, and defeat him by taking possession of the back country from which he draws his supplies. They would get rid of theism by generating mental habits that exclude it, as the spirit of the age excludes belief in miracles, in spiritism, and the supernatural in any and every form. This is an old device. It was attempted in the system of education devised for France by the Convention of 1793–’94; that devised the new antichristian calendar; but it did not prove effectual. The Prince and Princess Gallitzin brought up their only son Dmitri after the approved philosophy of the day, in profound ignorance of the doctrines and principles of religion; but he became a Christian notwithstanding, a priest even, and died a devoted and self-sacrificing missionary in what were, then the wilds of Western Pennsylvania. And after a brief saturnalia of atheism and blood, France herself returned to her Christian calendar, reopened the churches she had closed, and reconsecrated the altars she had profaned.

The belief in miracles may have perished among the Cosmists, but it is still living and vigorous in the minds of men who yield nothing, to say the least, in scientific culture and

attainments, to the cosmic philosophers themselves. The belief in a personal devil, who tempts men through their lusts, and works in the children of disobedience, has not perished, and is still firmly held by the better educated and the more enlightened portion of mankind; and scientific men in no sense inferior to Mr. Fiske, Herbert Spencer, or Auguste Comte, have investigated the facts alleged by the spiritists—not *spiritualists*, for spiritualists they are not—and found no difficulty in recognizing among them facts of a superhuman and diabolical origin. The first believers in spiritism we ever encountered were persons we had previously known as avowed atheists or cosmic philosophers. The men who can accept the Cosmic philosophy may deny God, may deny or accept any thing, but they should never speak of science.

That miracles are improbable *a priori* to the Cosmists may be true enough; that they are so to men of genuine science is not yet proven. Before they can be pronounced improbable or incapable of being proved, it must be proved that the supernatural or supercosmic does not exist; but this the Cosmists admit cannot be proved. They own they cannot prove that God does not exist, and if he does exist, he is necessarily supercosmic or supernatural; and the cosmos itself is a miracle, and a standing miracle, before the eyes of all men from the beginning. A miracle is what God does by himself immediately, as the natural is what he does mediately, through the agency of second or created causes, or does as *causa causarum*, that is, as *causa eminens*. A miracle, then, is no more improbable than the fact of creation, and no more incapable of proof than the existence of the cosmos itself. Hume's assertion that no amount of testimony is sufficient to prove a miracle, for it is always more in accordance with experience to believe the witnesses lie, than it is to believe that nature goes out of her way to work a miracle, is founded on a total misapprehension of what is meant by a miracle. Nature does not work the miracle; but God, the author of nature, works it; nor does nature in the miracle go out of her way, or deviate from her course. Her course and her laws remain unchanged. The miracle is the introduction or creation of a new fact by the power that creates nature herself, and is as provable by adequate testimony as is any natural fact whatever.

The Cosmists should bear in mind that when they relegate principles and causes, all except the cosmic phenomena and the law of their evolution, to the unknowable, the

unknowable is not necessarily non-existent, and should remember also that what is unknowable to them may be not only knowable but actually known to others. Our own ignorance is not a safe rule by which to determine the knowledge of others, or the line between the knowable and the unknowable.

“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”

For aught the Cosmist can say, there may be in the unknowable, principles and causes which render miracles not only possible but probable, and the supernatural as reasonable, to say the least, as the natural.

Indeed, the cosmic philosophers themselves, when it suits their purpose, distinguish between the unknowable and the non-existent, and contend that they are not atheists, because, though they exile God to the dark region of the unknowable, they do not deny that he exists. They deny what they call the “Christian theory of a personal or anthropomorphous God,” but not the existence of an infinite Being, Power, Force, or Reality, that underlies the cosmic phenomena, and which appears or is manifested in them. They actually assert the existence of such Being, and concede that the cosmic phenomena are “unthinkable” without it, though it is itself absolutely unknowable. Here is the admission at least that the unknowable exists, and that without it there would and could be no knowable.

But the theory they deny is not Christian theism. The Christian theist undoubtedly asserts the personality of God, but not that God is anthropomorphous. God is not made in the image of man, but man is made in the image and likeness of God. Man is not the type of God, but in God is the prototype of man; that is to say, man has his type in God, in the *idea exemplaris* in the divine mind, and as the idea in the divine mind is nothing else than the essence of God, the schoolmen say *Deus similitudo est rerum omnium*. Personality is the last complement of rational nature, or *suppositum intelligens*. An impersonal God is no God at all, for he lacks the complement of his nature, is incomplete, and falls into the category of nature. So in denying the personality of God, the Cosmists do really deny God, and are literally atheists.

The unknowable Infinite Being, Power, Force, or Reality, the Spencerian philosophers assert, is not God, and they

neither call nor regard it as God. In the first place, if absolutely unknowable, it is not, in any sense, thinkable, or assertable, but must be to our intelligence precisely as if it were not. In the next place, if these philosophers mean by the unknowable the incomprehensible, not simply the inapprehensible, which we charitably suppose is the fact, they still do not escape atheism; for the power or force they assert is not distinct from the cosmos, but is the reality, being, or substance of the cosmos, or the real cosmos of which the knowable or phenomenal cosmos is the appearance or manifestation. It is the assertion of nothing supercosmic or independent of the cosmos. Nothing is asserted but the real in addition to the phenomenal cosmos. Certainly the cosmic philosophers are themselves deplorably ignorant of Christian theology, or else they count largely on the ignorance of the public they address. Perhaps both suppositions are admissible.

The Cosmists, who present us the latest form of atheism, divide all things into knowable and unknowable. The unknowable they must concede is at least unknown, and consequently all their knowledge or science is confined to the knowable; and according to them the knowable is restricted to the phenomenal. Hence their science is simply the science of the phenomenal, and this is wherefore they assert the relativity of all knowledge. But there is no science of phenomena alone. Science, strictly taken, is the reduction of facts or phenomena to the principle or cause on which they depend, and which explains them. Science, properly speaking, is the science of principles or causes, as defined by Aristotle, and where there are no known causes or principles there is no science. The Cosmists, and even the Positivists, place all principles and causes in the unknowable, and consequently neither have nor can have any science. They therefore have not, and cannot have any scientific truth or principle, as we have already shown, to oppose to Christian theism.

The Cosmists restrict all knowledge to the knowledge of the cosmic phenomena, and their laws, which are themselves phenomenal; but phenomena are not knowable in themselves, for they do not exist in themselves. Regarded as pure phenomena, detached from the being or substance which appears in them, they are simply nothing. They are cognizable only in the cognition of that which they manifest, or of which they are appearances. But Herbert

Spencer places that, whatever it is, in the category of the unknowable, and consequently denies not only all science, but all knowledge of any sort or degree whatever.

It is a cardinal principle with the Spencerian school that all knowledge is relative, that is, knowledge of the relative only. But the assumption of the relativity of all knowledge is incompatible with the assertion of any knowledge at all. Sir William Hamilton indeed maintains the relativity of all knowledge, but he had the grace to admit that all philosophy ends in nescience. The relativity of knowledge means either that we know things not as they really are, *a parte rei*, but only as they exist to us, as affections of our own consciousness; or that we know not the reality, but only phenomena or appearances.* The Cosmists take it in both senses; but chiefly in the latter sense, as they profess to follow the objective method as opposed to the subjective. In either sense they deny all knowledge. Consciousness is the recognition of ourselves as cognitive subject, in the act of knowing what is not ourselves, or what is objective. If no object is cognized, there is no recognition of ourselves or fact of consciousness, and consequently no affection of consciousness. The soul does not know itself in itself, for it is not intelligible in itself: since, as St. Thomas says, it is not intelligence in itself, therefore it can know itself only in acting; and having only a dependent, not an independent, existence, it has need, in order to act, of the counter activity of that which is not itself. Hence every thought is a complex act, including, as will be more fully explained further on, simultaneously and inseparably, subject, object, and their relation. If no object, then no thought; and if no thought then, of course, no knowledge.

In the second sense, they equally deny all knowledge. Phenomena are relative to their being or substance, and are knowable only in the intuition of substance or being, and relations are cognizable only in the *relata*, for apart from the *relata* they do not exist, and are nothing. The relative is therefore incognizable without the intuition of the absolute, for without the absolute it is nothing, and nothing is not cognizable or cogitable. By placing the absolute, that

* The relativity of knowledge may also mean, and perhaps is sometimes taken to mean, that we know things not absolutely in themselves, but in their relations. This is true, but it does not make the knowledge relative, or knowledge of relations only, for relations are apprehensible only in the apprehension of the *relata*.

is, real being or substance, in the unknowable, the Cosmists really place the relative or the phenomenal also in the unknowable. If, then, we assert the relativity of all knowledge, and restrict the knowable to the relative and phenomenal, as did Protagoras and other Greek sophists castigated by Socrates or Plato, we necessarily deny all knowledge and even the possibility of knowledge.

Plato maintained that the science is not in knowing the phenomenal, but in knowing by means of the phenomenal the idea, substance, or reality it manifests, or of which it is the appearance, or image. He held that the idea is impressed on matter as the seal on wax, but that the science consists in knowing, by means of the impression, the idea or reality impressed, not in simply knowing the impression or phenomenal. Hence he held that all science is *per ideam*, or *per imaginem*, using the word idea to express alike the reality impressed, and the impression or image. He teaches that there is science only in rising, by means of the image impressed on matter—the *mimesis* in his language, the phenomenal in the language of our scientists—to the *methexis*, or participation of the divine idea, or the essence of the thing itself, which the phenomenal or the sensible copies, mimics, or imitates. Aristotle denies that all knowledge is relative, and teaches that all knowledge is *per speciem* or *per formam*, substantially Plato's doctrine, that all knowledge is *per ideam*; but he never held that science consisted in knowing the *species*, whether intelligible or sensible. The science consisted in knowing by it the substantial form represented, presented, as we should say, by the species to the mind.

Certain it is that there is no knowledge where there is nothing known, or where there is nothing to be known. The phenomenon is not the thing any more than the image is the thing imaged, and apprehension of the image is science only in so far as it serves as a medium of knowing the thing it represents. We know nothing in knowing the sign, if we know not that which it signifies. A sign signifying nothing to the mind is nothing, not even a sign. So of phenomena. They are nothing save in the reality they manifest, or of which they are the appearances, and if they manifest or signify nothing to the understanding, they are not even appearances. If, then, the reality, the *noumenon*, as Kant calls it, is relegated to the unknowable, there is no phenomenon, manifestation, or appearance in the region of

the knowable, and consequently nothing knowable, and therefore no actual or possible knowledge.

Either the phenomenal is the appearance or manifestation of some real existence, or it is not. If it is, then it is a grave mistake to relegate the real being or substance to the category of the unknowable; for what appears, or is manifest, is neither unknowable nor unknown. If it is not, if the cosmic phenomena are the appearance or manifestation of no reality, then in knowing them, nothing is known, and there is no knowledge at all.

The Positivists differ from the Cosmists, unless their name is ill chosen, in asserting that, as far as it goes, knowledge is positive, and not simply relative; but then they have no ground for the unity of science, which they assert, or for the coördination of all the sciences under one superior science which embraces and unifies them all, and which they profess to have discovered, and on which they insist as their peculiar merit. They reject all metaphysical principles, and among them the relation of cause and effect, and then must, if consistent, reject genera and species, and regard each object apprehended as an independent and self-existent being, or as an absolute existence; that is to say, they must assert as many gods as there are distinct objects or unit individualities intellectually apprehensible, for no existence dependent on another is apprehensible except under the relation of dependence. The contingent is apprehensible only under the relation of contingency, and that relation is apprehensible only in the apprehension of its correlative; therefore the contingent is not apprehensible without intuition of the necessary and independent. Things can be positively known by themselves alone, only on condition that they exist by themselves alone. This, applied to the cosmos, would deny in it, or any of its parts, all change, all movement, all progress of man and society, which the Positivists so strenuously assert. The Positivists, by rejecting the relation of cause and effect, and all metaphysical relations which are real not abstract relations, really deny, as do the Cosmists, all real knowledge, for all knowledge, every affirmation, every empirical judgment, presupposes the relation of cause and effect.

The Cosmists are so well aware that there is no science of the phenomenal alone, that they abandon their own principles, admit that the relative is unthinkable without the absolute, and concede that we are compelled, in order to think

the phenomenal, to think an infinite reality on which the phenomenal depends. What is thinkable is knowable, and therefore they assume that their unknowable is knowable, and deny their cardinal principle that all knowledge is relative. An extract from another lecture by Mr. Fiske bears out this assertion.

"Upon what grounds did we assert of the Deity that it is unknowable? We were driven to the conclusion that the Deity is unknowable because that which exists independently of intelligence and out of relation to it, which presents neither *likeness*, *difference*, nor *relation*, cannot be cognized. Now, by precisely the same process, we were driven to the conclusion that the cosmos is unknowable only in so far as it is absolute. It is only as existing independently of our intelligence and out of relation to it, that we predicate unknowableness of the cosmos. As manifested to our intelligence, the cosmos is the universe of phenomena—the realm of the knowable. We know stars and planets, we know the surface of our earth, we know life and mind in their various manifestations, individual and social; and while we apply to this vast aggregate of phenomena the name *universe*, we can by no means predicate identity of the universe and the Deity. To do so would be to confound phenomena with noumena, the relative with the absolute, the knowable with the unknowable. It would be, in short, to commit the error of pantheism.

"But underlying this aggregate of phenomena, to whose extension we know no limit in space or time, we *are compelled* to postulate an absolute Reality, a Something whose existence does not depend on the presence of a percipient mind—which existed before the genesis of intelligence and will continue to exist even though intelligence vanish from the scene. In other words, there is a synthesis of phenomena which we know as affections of our consciousness. Instead of regarding these phenomena as generated within our consciousness, and referable solely to it for their existence, we are *compelled to regard* them as the manifestations of some absolute reality, which, as knowable only through its phenomenal manifestations, is in itself unknowable. This is the whole story; and whether we call this absolute reality the Deity or the objective world of noumena, seems to me to depend solely upon the attitude, religious or scientific, which we assume in dealing with the subject."

The cosmic philosopher in order to know phenomena, is compelled to postulate an absolute reality as the ground or substance of the phenomena, and which is knowable through their manifestation; consequently, to restrict the knowable to the phenomenal and relative is only declaring that all knowledge is impossible. The Cosmists concede it, and therefore make what they declare to be absolutely unknowable, in a certain degree at least, knowable, concede that we

may and do know that it is, and what it is in relation to the cosmic phenomena, though not what it is in itself. But why are we compelled to postulate the absolute reality, but because the phenomena are not knowable without intuition of the reality which they manifest? or because in apprehending the phenomenal we really have intuition of the absolute or the reality manifested?

Mr. Fiske, however, even after abandoning the doctrine that the absolute or real is unknowable, by no means escapes atheism. The absolute reality, Force, or Something which he asserts as underlying the aggregate of the cosmic phenomena, which aggregate of phenomena he calls *universe*, is not God, as he would have us admit, but is merely the cosmic reality of which the cosmic phenomena are the appearance, and distinguishable from it only as the appearance is distinguishable from that which appears. It is, as we have already shown, only the real cosmos, the being or substance of which the cosmic phenomena are the manifestation. It makes the "Deity" it asserts identically the substance of the cosmic phenomena, which is either pure pantheism or pure atheism, as you call it either God or cosmos, that is, nature, since it is indistinguishable from the real cosmos, and distinguishable only from the cosmic phenomena. The cosmic philosophy does not, then, as it pretends, solve the religious problem and reconcile atheism and theism in a higher generalization than either, as Herbert Spencer maintains.

Herbert Spencer, in his *First Principles of a New System of Philosophy*,* says, "that with regard to the origin of the universe or cosmos, three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made: 1, the universe is self-existent; 2, the universe is self-created; and 3, the universe is created by an external"—or, as we should express it, a supercosmic—"agency." He rejects all three as absolutely inconceivable. If the cosmos is neither self-existent nor self-created, nor yet created by an external agency, that is, by a power above it and independent of it, it cannot exist at all, and Mr. Spencer simply asserts universal nihilism and of course universal nescience; for where nothing is or exists, there can be no knowledge or science. Negation is intelligible only by virtue of the affirmation it denies.

The author refutes the first two of the three suppositions con-

* Part I, No. 11, 2d edition.

clusively enough, and we grant him that the cosmos is neither self-existent nor self-created. Then either it does not exist, and then no cosmic science; or it is created by an independent, supercosmic agency or power, and then it is contingent, and dependent on its cause, or the power that creates it. If so, there can be no purely cosmic science; for the dependent is not cognizable without intuition of the independent, nor the contingent without intuition of the necessary, as we shall prove at length, when we come to the positive proofs of Christian theism.

This is sufficient to prove that there is and can be no purely cosmic science, even by the confession of the latest atheistic school we are acquainted with. It is idle then to pretend to controvert Christian theism in the name of science; for if it be denied, all science, all knowledge is denied. The Spencerian philosophy is therefore simply elaborated ignorance, and pure emptiness.

V.—THEOLOGAINS AND THE SCIENTISTS.

It is not pretended that atheists, Cosmists, or Comtists, have, as a matter of fact, no science; that they have made no successful cosmic investigations, or hit upon no important discoveries and inventions in the material or sensible order. It is readily admitted that the patient labors and unwearied researches and explorations of the scientists, both theists and non-theists, in the fields of physical science, have enlarged the boundaries of our knowledge, and given to man a mastery over the forces of nature on which no little of what is called modern civilization depends. What is denied is, that the scientists, Comtists, or Cosmists, have discovered or attained to any scientific truth that conflicts with Christian theology, and that on their own principles they have or can have any science at all.

The Cosmists and Comtists have senses and intellect as well as others; and there is no reason in the world, while they confine themselves to the observation and classification of physical facts, and so long as they allow free scope to their intellectual faculties and do not attempt to force their action to conform to their preconceived theories, why they should not arrive at sound inductions. The human mind is truer than their theories, and broader than their so-called science; and when suffered to act according to its own laws proves its natural object is truth. So long as they confine

their investigations within the respective fields of the special sciences, and use the natural faculties with which they are endowed, they can and often do labor successfully. Lalande was a respectable astronomer; the *Mécanique Céleste* of the atheist, La Place is more than respectable for the mathematical genius and knowledge it displays; Alexander von Humboldt's *Cosmos* is an encyclopædia of physical sciences, as they stood in his day; but in all these and other instances the human mind holds intuitively principles which transcend the finite and the phenomenal, and without which there could have been no science; but principles which both the cosmic and Comtean theories exclude from the realm of the knowable. It is not the facts alleged that are objected to, but the false theories advanced in explanation of them, the conclusions drawn from them, and the application of these conclusions to an order that transcends the order to which the facts belong, and which, if valid, would exclude the facts themselves.

The atheistic scientists exclude theology and metaphysics from the knowable simply because they are too ignorant of those sciences to be aware that without the principles which they supply there could be no physical science; or to know that in asserting physical science they really assert the very principles they theoretically deny. Professor Huxley asserts protoplasm as the physical basis of life; yet he denies that there is any cognition or even intuition of the relation of cause and effect. How then can he assert any nexus or causative relation between protoplasm and life? He does not pretend that protoplasm is life; he only pretends that it is its physical basis. But how can it be its physical basis if there is between it and life no necessary relation of cause and effect? Or if protoplasm is not known to be the principle or basis of life, how can it be known to produce or support it? But principles and relations, we are told, are metaphysical, and therefore excluded from the knowable. Protoplasm, the professor owns, is dead matter; how, then without a cause of some sort vivifying it, can it become *living* matter? What is protested against is not the assertion of protoplasm as the physical or material basis of life, —though we believe nothing of the sort, for proteine is as imaginary as the plastic soul dreamed of by Plato and adopted by Cudworth and Gioberti,—but the denial of the principle of cause and effect, and then assuming it as the

principle of our conclusions, or asserting as scientific, conclusions which can have no validity without it.

Professor Huxley follows Hume, who denies that we have any knowledge, by experience, of causative force, or that the antecedent produces the consequence. Dr. Thomas Brown, who succeeded Dugald Stewart in the chair of philosophy in the Edinburgh University, maintains the same, and resolves the relation of cause and effect into the relation of invariable antecedence and consequence, or simply a relation of time. Yet if the antecedent only goes before the consequent, without producing or placing it, no conclusion is possible. Induction is reasoning as much as deduction, and all reasoning is syllogistic in principle, if not in form; and there is no syllogism without a middle term, and there is no middle term without the principle of cause and effect, which connects necessarily the conclusion with the premises, the antecedent with the consequent, as cause and effect. Deny causality and you deny all reasoning, all logical relations, and can assert no real relation between protoplasm, or any thing else, and life.

The atheist and Sir William Hamilton exclude the infinite from the cognizable and declare it incogitable; and yet either in his geometry will talk of lines that may be infinitely extended, which cannot be done without thinking the infinite. If there is no infinitely real, how can there be the infinitely possible? If there is no infinite being, there can be no infinite ability; if no infinite ability, there is no infinitely possible, and then no infinitely possible geometrical lines. Truly, then, has it been said, "an atheist may be a geometrician, but if there were no God, there could be no geometry." In mathematics, which is a mixed science, there is an ideal and apodictic element on which the empirical element depends, and the apodictic is not cogitable without intuition of infinite being and its creative act, any more than is the empirical itself; yet both Cosmists and Comtists hold mathematics to be a positive science.

Herbert Spencer asserts the relativity of all knowledge, and he, Sir William Hamilton, and Dr. Mansel deny that the absolute can be known. But both relative and absolute are metaphysical conceptions, and connote one another, and neither can be known by itself alone, or without cognition or intuition of the other. Other instances might be adduced, and will be soon, in which the Cosmists use, so to speak, principles which they either deny or declare to be unknow-

able, and which are really theological or metaphysical principles, and it is by those principles that they are able to know any thing at all beyond the intelligence they have in common with the beasts that perish. Not heeding these, they fall, in the construction of their theories, systematically into errors, which when they trust their own minds and follow their common sense, they avoid as do other men.

As Cousin somewhere remarks, there may be less in philosophy than in common sense, in reflection than in intuition, but there can never be more. The intuitions, or what Cousin calls the primitive or spontaneous beliefs of mankind, are the same in all men; and the differences among men begin the moment they begin to reflect on the data furnished by intuition, and attempt to explain them, to render an account of them to themselves, or, in other words, to philosophize. The scientists have the same intuitions, though atheists, that other men have, and in the field of the special sciences they are equally trustworthy; it is only when they leave the field of the sciences and enter that of philosophy, which with us is the name for what is commonly called natural theology, and which is the science of principles, that they err. Habituated to the study of physical facts alone, they overlook or deny an order of facts as real, as evident, as certain, as any of the physical facts they have observed and classified according to their real or supposed physical laws, and even ulterior, and without which the physical facts and laws would not and could not exist. It is not as scientists they specially err, but as philosophers and theologians, that is, in the account they render of the origin, principles, and meaning of the cosmic facts they observe and classify.

It is not with science or the cultivation of the sciences that philosophers and theologians quarrel, and it is very possible that philosophers and theologians have at times been too indifferent to the study of physical facts or the cultivation of the so-called natural sciences, and have, in consequence, lost with the physicists much of the influence they might otherwise have retained. Yet it is a great mistake, not to say a calumny, to accuse them of holding that the facts of the physical order can be determined, *a priori*, by a knowledge of metaphysical or theological principles. The scholastics of the middle ages held this no more than did my Lord Bacon himself. Observation and induction were as much their method as they were his. Bacon invented or discovered no new method, as is conceded by Lord Macaulay him-

self; all he did was to give an additional impulse to the study of material nature, towards which the age in which he lived was already turning its attention, as a necessary consequence of Luther's movement in an untheological direction. Yet Bacon maintained strenuously that the method which he recommended to be followed in the study of the physical sciences is wholly inapplicable to the study of metaphysical science or philosophy. His pretended followers have overlooked what he had the good sense to say on this point; have assumed that his method is as applicable in the study of principles as in the study of facts, and, consequently, have made shipwreck of both philosophy and science. The result of their error may be seen in Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution, which is only the revival of the doctrine of the Greek sophists, refuted by Plato and Aristotle, especially by Plato in his *Theætetus*.

The quarrel with the scientists is with them, not as scientists or physicists, but with them as philosophers and theologians; and as philosophers and theologians, because they give us philosophy or theology only as an induction from physical facts. If their induction were strictly logical it could not be accepted, because the physical facts do not include all the elements of thought, and, in fact, constitute only a part, and that the lowest part, either of the real or the knowable. Their theories are too low and too narrow for the real, and exclude the more elevated and universal intuitions of the race. Induction is drawing a general conclusion from particular facts. To its validity the enumeration of particulars must be complete, and it is only by virtue of a principal that is universal and necessary that the conclusion can be drawn, otherwise it is a mere abstraction. The induction from physical facts may be perfectly valid in the order of physical facts, as applied to the special class of physical facts generalized, and yet be of no validity when applied beyond that class and to a different order of facts. The inductions of the chemist, the mechanic, the electrician, may be perfectly just when applied to dead matter, and yet be wholly inadmissible when applied to the living subject. This is the mistake into which Professor Huxley falls in regard to his physical basis of life. His analysis of protoplasm may be very just, but it is operated on a dead subject, and no conclusion from it, applied to the living subject, is valid; for in the living subject it is an element or a fact that no chemical analysis can detect, and hence no chemical

synthesis can recombine the several components the analysis detects so as to reproduce living protoplasm. The induction is not valid, for it does not enumerate all the facts, and also because it exceeds the order of facts analyzed. So when Herbert Spencer tells us in his *Biology* that "life is the result of the mechanical, chemical, and electrical arrangement of the particles of matter," he draws a conclusion which goes beyond the facts he has analyzed, and assumes it to be valid even when applied to a different order of facts. The physiologist commits the same error when he infers the qualities of the living blood from the analysis of dead blood,—the only blood which, from the nature of the case, he can analyze. Hence, chemical physiology is far from being scientific, and the pathology founded on morbid anatomy, or the dissection of the dead subject, is far from being uniformly trustworthy.

Many theologians fall into an analogous error, and seek to infer God by way of induction from the physical facts observed in nature,—the very facts from which the atheist concludes there is no God. The late Père Gratry, in his *Connaissance de Dieu*, contends with rare earnestness and eloquence that the existence of God is proved by induction. Dr. McCosh, resting the whole argument against the atheist on marks of design, which is an induction from particular facts, does the same. Induction is really only an abstraction or generalization, and at best the God obtainable by induction can be only a generalization, and God as a generalization or an abstraction is simply no God at all; for he would be nothing distinct from or independent of the facts generalized. Père Gratry was a mathematician, and arrived at God in the same way that the mathematician in the calculus arrives at infinitesimals, that is, by eliminating the finite. But supposing there is intuition of the finite only, the elimination of the finite would give us simply zero, not the infinite.

Then there is another difficulty; the finite and infinite are correlatives, and correlatives connote each other, the one cannot be known without the other, nor can either be logically inferred from the other. The principle of induction, when it means any thing more than classification or abstraction, is the relation of cause and effect. But cause and effect, again, are correlatives,—though not, as Sir William Hamilton asserts, reciprocal,—and therefore connote each other, and cannot be known separately. The argument from design, otherwise called the teleological argument or

argument from the end or final cause, is open to a similar objection. The final cause presupposes a first cause, and if we know not that there is a first cause, we cannot assert a final cause, and therefore are unable to infer design. The argument from design has its value when once it is determined that the universe has a first cause, or has been created, and the question is not as to the existence, but as to the attributes of that cause. Till then it simply begs the question.

The inductions of the physicists within the order of facts observed, and when strictly logical, are valid enough, as every day proves, by bringing them to the test of experiment; but in making them the physicist actually avails himself of the principle or the relation of cause and effect, which he is able to do, because, as a matter of fact, he holds it from intuition represented by language, though it is only the metaphysician or philosopher that takes note of it, or is able to verify it. The inductions of the Cosmists drawn professedly from physical facts alone, are invalid on their own principles, because the Cosmists reject, at least as cognizable, the relation of cause and effect, the principle of all induction or synthetic reasoning; and are invalid also on any principle when opposed to the metaphysician or theologian, because they are drawn from physical facts alone, and do not include the facts of the intelligible and moral order, in which are the principle and cause of the physical facts themselves.

This is still more the case, when we add to philosophy or natural theology, the supernatural order, made known to us by supernatural revelation. The Cosmists recognize and study only the facts, or phenomena as they improperly call them, of the physical universe, and from these only physical inductions are possible. They have only a physical world, and their reasonings and conclusions, even when true within that world, are inapplicable to any thing beyond and above it, and therefore can never prove any thing against theology, natural or supernatural, and on their own principles, as we have seen, their inductions are of no value beyond the limits of the physical world itself. They err in taking a part of the real or a part of the knowable for the whole. They may say that they do not deny the reality of what they call the unknowable, that is, being, principles, causes, &c.; but they have no right to say that all that transcends the order of physical facts and their laws, the special subject of their

study, is unknowable. It may be unknown to them, but it may be both knowable and known to others. Also, by not knowing what lies beyond the range of their own studies, they may and do give a false account of their own science. This is, in fact, really the case with them. Many of their inductions are valid in the physical order, as experiment proves; but without the intuition of the metaphysical relation of cause and effect the mind could make no induction, consequently they are wrong, and the very truth of their inductions proves that they are wrong, in declaring that the relation pertains to the unknowable.

The Cosmists do not err chiefly as physicists, but as philosophers and theologians, and as long as they are contented to be scientists and report simply the result of their scientific researches and explorations there can be no quarrel with them on the part either of theologians or philosophers; but the quarrel, as has been shown, begins when they attempt to theorize, or to construct with their physical facts alone a cosmic philosophy, and to say it cannot embrace, because no philosophy based on physical facts alone can embrace, the principle of all the real and all the knowable, since the physical is neither the whole nor the principle of the whole; nor is it commensurate with the reality presented intuitively to every mind.

Undoubtedly, neither the philosophy nor the theology can be true that contradicts any physical fact, if fact it be, but no explanation or theory of physical facts is admissible that contradicts or denies any metaphysical or theological principle.

There are no physical facts that contradict or in the slightest degree impugn Christian theism, as we hope to show in this or a future essay. In point of fact, atheists, pantheists, Cosmists, or Positivists, do not oppose or pretend to oppose any facts to what they call "the theistical hypothesis," they only oppose to it their inductions, their theories and hypotheses, or their explanation of the class of facts that have come under their observation. These, we have seen, are untenable, for without the principles they are intended to deny they cannot even be constructed. Now, theories that contradict their own principle can make nothing against Christian theism, cannot disprove it, or cause in any mind that understands the question, the slightest doubt of it, and the theist has a perfect right to treat them with sovereign contempt. At least, they assign no reason why Christian

theism should be ousted from its possession. They cannot overcome the argument from prescription, and place Christian theism on its defence, or compel it to produce its title-deeds.

Here our refutation of atheism properly ends, and no more need be said; but while we deny that we are bound to do any thing more, we are disposed to produce our title-deeds and prove positively, by unanswerable arguments, the falsity of atheism, or to demonstrate, as fully as logic can demonstrate, Christian theism.

VI.—INCONCLUSIVE PROOFS.

PHILOSOPHERS and theologians do not necessarily adduce the best possible arguments to prove their theses, and may sometimes use very weak and even inconclusive arguments. An argument for the existence of God may also seem to one mind conclusive, and the reverse to another. Men usually argue from their own point of view, and take as ultimate the principles which they have never doubted, or heard questioned, although far from being in reality ultimate, and thus take for granted what for others needs to be proved. Men also may hold the truth, be as well assured of it as they are of their own existence, even possess great good sense and sound judgment, and yet be very unskilful in defending it,—utterly unable to assign good and valid reasons for it. They know they are right, but know not how to prove it.

St. Thomas, the Doctor Angelicus, maintains* that the existence of God is demonstrable, not from principles really *a priori* or universal,—for nothing can be more universal or more ultimate than God from which his existence can be concluded, since he is the first principle alike in being and in knowing,—but as the cause from the effect; and this he proves by five different arguments: The first is drawn from the empirical fact of motion and the necessity of a first mover, not itself movable; the second is drawn from the empirical fact of particular efficient causes and the necessity of a first efficient cause, itself uncaused; the third is taken from the fact that some things are possible and some are not, and as all things cannot be merely possible, therefore there must be something which is *per se*, necessary, and *in actu*. The

* Sum. theol., part I, quæst. 1, art. 2 et 3.

fourth proof is drawn from the fact that there are different degrees in things, some being more and others less good, true, noble, perfect, and therefore demand the perfect alike in the order of the true and the good,—a being in whom all diversities are identified and all degrees are included, and which is their source and complement. The fifth is drawn from the fact of order and government, and the necessity of a supreme governor. These all conclude God, if we may so speak, from a fact of sensible experience, and are empirical proofs.

Dr. McCosh, president of Princeton College, New Jersey, a man of no mean philosophical repute, relies wholly on the principle of cause and effect, as does St. Thomas, and dismisses all arguments but Paley's argument, or the argument from design. Père Gratry (now dead), of the New Oratory, relies, in his *Connaissance de Dieu*, on induction from intellectual and ethical facts; the late Dr. Potter, Episcopalian bishop of Pennsylvania, in his *Philosophy of Religion*, does virtually the same. A writer in the *British Quarterly Review* for July, 1871, in a very able article on *Theism*, examines and rejects all the arguments usually adduced to prove that God is, except that drawn from intuition, or, as we understand him, that which asserts the direct and immediate empirical intuition of God, or the Divine Being. Dr. Hodge, an eminent Presbyterian divine, in his *Systematic Theology*, accepts all the arguments usually adduced, some as proving one thing, and others as proving another pertaining to theism, and holds that no one argument alone suffices to prove the whole. Dr. John Henry Newman, in his *Apologia pro Vita sua*, says he has never been able to prove to his own satisfaction the existence of God by reason; he can only prove it is probable that there is a God, and appears to have written his *Grammar of Assent* to prove that probability is enough for all practical purposes, since we are obliged in nearly all the ordinary affairs of life to act on probabilities alone. His belief in God he seems to derive from conscience. The Holy See has decided against the Traditionalists that the existence of God *can* be proved with *certainly* by reasoning prior to faith, and the Holy See has also improbated the doctrine of the Louvain professors, that we have immediate cognition of God,—a doctrine improbated by reason itself; for if man had immediate cognition of God, no proofs of his existence would be necessary, since no man

could doubt his existence any more than his own, or than that the sun shines at noonday in the heavens when his eyes behold it.

The general tendency in our day is to conclude the cause from the effect, and to conclude God as designer, from the marks of design; or the adaptation of means to ends discoverable, or assumed to be discoverable, in ourselves and the external world. The objection to all arguments of this sort, that is to say, to all psychological, cosmological, and teleological arguments, which depend on the principle of cause and effect, is, that they all beg the question, or take for granted what requires to be proved. They all assume that the soul and cosmos are effects. Grant them to be effects, it follows necessarily that they have had a cause, and a cause adequate to the effect. As to that there can be no doubt. Cause and effect are correlatives, and correlatives connote one another, and neither is knowable alone. When we know any thing is an effect, we know it has a cause, whether we know what that cause is or not. But how prove that the soul or the cosmos is an *effect*? This the atheist denies, and this is the point to be proved against him, and how is it to be proved from the facts of experience?

St. Thomas assumes, in his second proof, that we have experience of particular efficient causes. This is denied by Hume, Kant, Dr. Thomas Brown, Sir William Hamilton, Dr. Mansel, and by all the Comtists, Cosmists, and atheists of every species. Even Dr. Reid, the founder of the Scottish school, denies that we know by experience any power in the so-called cause that produces the effect, but contends that we are obliged, by the very constitution of our nature or of the human mind, to believe it. Kant agrees with Reid, and makes the irresistible belief a form of the understanding. Huxley avowedly follows Hume, as do the great body of non-Christian scientists. Dr. Brown says that all we know of cause and effect is invariable antecedence and consequence, and maintains that, so far as experience goes, the relation of cause and effect is a relation of invariable sequence,—simply a relation in the order of time. The question does not stand where it did when St. Thomas wrote, and to meet the speculations of the day we are obliged to go behind him, and establish principles which he could take for granted, or dismiss as inserted in human nature itself, that is, as we say, intuitively given.

Even if experience could prove particular effects, and

therefore particular and contingent efficient causes, we could not conclude from them universal and necessary causes, or the one universal cause, for the universal cannot be logically concluded from the particular, and the God that could be concluded would be only a generalization or abstraction, and no real God at all. Or if this is denied, which it cannot well be, God could be concluded only under the relation of cause, as *causa causarum*, if you please, but still only as efficient cause, and therefore only as essentially cause, and substance or being only in that he is cause. This supposes him necessarily a cause, and obliged to cause in order to be or exist. This would make creation necessary, and God obliged from the intrinsic necessity of his own nature to create,—the error of Cousin, our old master, to whom we owe the best part of our philosophical discipline. But this is only one of the many forms of pantheism, itself only a form of atheism.

Dr. McCosh rests the whole question on the marks of design in man and the cosmos. Design and designer are correlatives, and connote each other; and consequently the one cannot be proved as the condition of proving the other: for the proof of the one is *ipso facto* the proof of both. Prove design and you prove, of course, a designer. But how prove design, if you know not as yet that the world has been made or created? The most you can do is to prove that there are in nature things analogous to what in the works of man are the product of art or design; but analogy is not identity, and how do you prove that what you call design is not nature, or *natura naturans*? Does the bee construct its cell, the beaver its dam, or the swallow her nest by intelligent design, as man builds his house? or by instinct, the simple force of nature? Paley's illustration of the watch found by the traveller in a desert place is illusory: for the Indian who saw a watch for the first time took it to be a living thing, not a piece of mechanism or art.

But even granting the marks of design are proved, all that can be concluded, is not a supercosmic God or Creator, but simply that the world is ordered and governed by an intelligent mind; it does not necessarily carry us beyond the *Anima mundi* of Aristotle, or the Supreme Artificer of Plato, operating with preëxisting materials and doing the best he can with them. They do not authorize us to conclude the really supramundane God, by the sole energy of his word creating the heavens and the earth and all things therein from nothing, as asserted by Christian theism. They

can be explained as well by supposing the *causa immanens* with Spinoza, as by supposing a *causa efficiens*.

The cosmologists undertake to conclude the existence of God from the facts or phenomena of the universe. The universe is contingent, dependent, insufficient for itself, and therefore it must have had a creator and upholder, who is himself necessary, not contingent, and is independent, self-subsisting, self-sufficing. Nothing more true. But whence learn we that the universe is contingent, dependent, and insufficient for itself? We know not this fact by experience or empirical intuition. Besides, necessary and contingent are correlatives, and there is no intuition of the one without intuition of the other.

The psychologists profess to conclude God by way of induction from the facts of the soul. Thus Descartes says, *Cogito, ergo sum*, and professes to deduce, after the manner of the geometers, God and the universe from his own undeniable personal existence. Certainly, if God were not, Descartes could not exist, but from the soul alone, only the soul can be deduced, and from purely psychological facts induction can give us only psychological generalizations or laws. Take the several facts, attributes, or perfections of the soul, and suppose them carried up to infinity, it would still be only a generalization, for their substance would still be the soul, distinct and different by nature from the divine substance or being. God is not man completed; nor is man, as Gioberti says, "an incipient God, or God who begins." Man is indeed made in the image and likeness of God, not God in the image and likeness of man. He is not anthropomorphic; though his likeness in which we are created enables us to understand, by way of analogy, something of his infinite attributes, and to hold, when not prevented by sin and when elevated by grace, a more or less intimate communion with him. Christianity, indeed, teaches that man is destined to union with God as his beatitude, but the human personality remains ever distinct from the divine.

We are not certain in what sense Père Gratry understands induction. Probably our inability arises from our comparative ignorance of mathematics. He says the soul by induction darts at once to God and seizes him, so to speak, by intelligence and love, whatever all that may mean. We can understand the *élan* of the soul to God whom it knows and loves, but we cannot understand how a soul ignorant of God can, by an interior and sudden spring, jump to a knowledge

of him. Père Gratry says the soul arrives at the knowledge of God as the mathematician in the calculus arrives at infinitesimals, namely, by eliminating the finite. Eliminate the finite, he says, and you have the infinite. Not at all, mon Père. Eliminate the finite, and you have, as we have already said, simply zero. The infinite is not the negation of the finite. Infinitesimals again, are nothing, for there is and can be no infinitely little. The error comes right in the end, so far as mathematics is concerned, for it is equal on both sides, and the error on one side neutralizes the error on the other side.

The late Dr. Potter, Protestant bishop of Pennsylvania, relies on induction, and chiefly on induction from the ethical facts of the soul. But the ethical argument to prove the existence of God does not avail, for, till his existence is proved, there is no basis for ethics. The soul has a capacity to receive and obey a moral law, but that law is not founded in its nature or imposed by it. The moral law proceeds from God as final cause of creation, as the physical laws proceed from him as first cause, and is the law of our perfection, necessary to be obeyed in order to fulfil our destiny, or to obtain our supreme good or beatitude. If there is no God, there is and can be no moral law, and then no morality. Till you know God is, and is the final cause of the universe, you cannot call any facts of the soul ethical.

The argument of St. Anselm in his *Monologium* is the fourth of St. Thomas, and concludes God as the perfect from the imperfect, of which we are conscious, or which we know by experience in ourselves, or as the complement of man, an argument which contains a germ of truth, but errs by overlooking the fact that the perfect and imperfect are correlatives, and that the one cannot be inferred from the other because the one is not cognizable or cogitable without the other. St. Anselm himself seems not to have been satisfied with the argument of his *Monologium*, and gave subsequently in his *Proslogium*, what he regarded as a briefer and more conclusive argument. We have in our minds the idea of the most perfect being, a greater than which cannot be thought. But greater is a being *in re*, than a being *in intellectu*. If then there is not *in re* a most perfect being, than which a greater cannot be thought or conceived, then we can think a greater and more perfect being than we can, which is a contradiction. Therefore the most perfect being, a greater than which cannot be thought, does

and must exist *in re*, as well as *in intellectu*, since we certainly have the idea in our minds.

This argument would be conclusive if it were shown that the idea is objective and an intuition, as we shall endeavor, further on, to prove that it is. Leibnitz somewhere remarks that it would be conclusive, if it were first proved that God is possible, which shows that Leibnitz, with his universal genius and erudition, could be as weak as ordinary mortals. It was his weakness, in which he anticipated Hegel, to place the possible prior to and independent of the real. If we could suppose God not to exist *in actu*, we could not suppose him to be possible; for possibility cannot actualize itself and there would be no real to reduce it to act. The error of Hegel is in supposing the possible, for his *reine Seyn* is merely possible being, precedes *das Wesen*, or the real, and has in itself the tendency or aptness to become real—*das Wesen*—the old Gnostic doctrine that makes all things originate in the Byssus or Void.

There is no possible without the real, for possibility is the ability of the real. The possible in relation to God is what God is able to do, and in relation to man is what man is able to do with the faculties God has given him. There is nothing, we may add on which philosophers have, it seems to us, been more puzzled, or more bewildered others, than on this very question of possibility. If there were no actual, there would and could be no possible, for possibility, prescinded from the reality of the actual, is simply nothing. The excellent Father Tongiorgi imagines that possibility is not nothing, but even something prescinded from the ability of the actual, and indeed something which, like the *fatum* of the Stoics, limits or binds the power of God himself. Some things he holds are possible, and others are impossible, even to God. He forgets that nothing is impossible to God but to contradict, that is, annihilate his own eternal and necessary being. He is his own possibility, and the measure of the possible. It is his being that founds the nature of things, about which philosophers talk so much.

As to the argument of the *Proslodium*, its validity depends on the sense in which the word *idea* is taken. If we take it in a psychological sense, as a mere mental conception, the argument may be a logical puzzle, but concludes nothing.

If we suppose idea can exist *in intellectu* without existing *in re*, the argument concludes at best only a psychological

abstraction ; but if we suppose the mental idea to be the intuition of the real and objective, as we have just said, it is valid and conclusive. St. Anselm seems to us to take *idea* in a subjective sense and to conclude the objective from the subjective ; if so, his argument is psychological, and, like all psychological arguments, inconclusive. Yet he seems to maintain that it is also objective, and that it could not exist *in mente*, if it did not exist *in re*, and therefore conclusive.

Descartes deduces the existence of God from the soul, in which the idea of God he holds, is innate. But what is innate, that is, born in the soul and with it, is the soul, or at least psychical ; consequently, the argument is psychological, and proves nothing. Besides, Descartes, as is not seldom the case with him, falls into a paralogism, and reasons in a vicious circle ; he takes the idea *in intellectu* to prove that God is, and the veracity of God to prove the objective truth of the idea. He also tells us, elsewhere, when hard pressed by his opponents, that he means by the innate idea of God only that the soul has the innate faculty of thinking God, and therefore concludes God is because man thinks him ; but this is only asserting, in other words, that the soul has the faculty of knowing God by immediate cognition—recently improbated by the Holy See—and rests on the principle that thought can never be erroneous, which is not true, otherwise every man would be infallible, incapable of error.

The ontological arguments, so-called, founded on the alleged immediate cognition of being, are in nearly all cases, not ontological, but really psychological, as *das reine Seyn* of Hegel, which is simply an abstraction, therefore worthless ; for the soul has no power in itself alone of immediately apprehending being. The psychological arguments are all inconclusive because they all assume the point to be proved. Yet it is not denied that the argument from design, and others that rest on the principle of cause and effect, as well as those drawn from the ethical wants and aspirations of the soul, are all valuable, not indeed in proving that God is, but in proving what he is. St. Paul tells us that “the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen from the beginning of the world, being understood by the things that are made,” Rom. i. 20, but the Apostle does not tell us that the existence of God is a logical conclusion from cosmological or psychological facts or from “the things that are made.” Indeed, St. Thomas cites

this text to prove what God is, rather than to prove that he is, for he throughout is replying to the question *Quid est Deus*, rather than to the question, *An sit Deus*, as may be seen by referring to the first article of the question cited above, in which he answers the question, *Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum*.

The great question the Apostles and the Fathers had to argue against the Gentiles was not precisely the existence of God, but that of the Divine Unity and the fact of creation and providence. In fact, the distinguishing and essential feature of the Mosaic doctrine was less that God is one than that God is the one Almighty Creator of all things. The existence of one God, as has been seen, was not denied by the Gentiles, except by a few philosophers. The mother error of Gentilism was the loss of the tradition of creation, which paved the way for divinizing the forces of nature, and at length for the worship of demons, always held inferior to a Supreme Divinity, of which some dim reminiscence was always retained.

VII.—ANALYSIS OF THOUGHT.

Atheism is not natural to mankind, and is always, wherever found, the fruit of a false or defective philosophy and erroneous theories mistaken for science. The philosophy which has been generally cultivated since Descartes made his attempt to divorce philosophy from theology, of which it is simply the rational element, and to erect it into a separate and independent science, complete in itself, and embracing the entire natural order, has hardly recognized and set forth with much clearness or distinctness the principles of a conclusive demonstration of theism, or a scientific refutation of atheism. If there is atheism pretending to found itself on science, we may charge it to the false philosophy which has generally obtained, except when connected with Catholic theology, and kept from going astray by tradition and common sense. From the philosophers and false scientists atheism has descended to the people through popular literature, and diffused itself among the half-learned, chiefly by modern lectures and journalism, till literature, art, science, ethics, and especially politics, have become infected, and the very air we breathe saturated with it.

In order to refute atheism and to check the atheistic tendency of modern society, it is necessary to revise the generally

received philosophy, to correct its faulty principles and method, to supply its defects, to harmonize it with common sense and the traditions of the race, and to establish, what it is far from doing, the identity of the principles of science and the principles of things, or the identity of the knowable and the real, that is, to show that the order of science follows the order of being, and in their principles they are identical. To do this in a manner as intelligible as possible to the general reader, it is necessary to set forth the real principles on which philosophy is founded. Philosophy itself is the science of principles, and the principles must be real, that is, the principles of things, not simply mental conceptions or concepts, or the science will want reality and be no science at all. Real principles are the principles, not of science alone, without which nothing can be known, but principles of things, on which all things depend, and without which nothing is or exists.

Obviously then the principles of philosophy and of reality are *a priori*, and precede both the science and the reality that depends on them, or of which they are the principles. They must, then, be given, and neither created nor obtained by the mind's own activity, for without them the mind can neither operate nor even exist. The great error of the dominant philosophy of our times is in the assumption that the mind starts without principles, and finds them or obtains them by its own activity or its own painful exertions. Hence it places method before principles, which is no less absurd than to suppose that the mind, the soul, generates or creates itself. Principles are given, not found by the mind operating without principles. They are given in the fact which we call thought, and we ascertain what they are only by a diligent and careful analysis of thought.

In order to correct the errors of the prevailing philosophy, to ascertain the principles of a true philosophy, and of real science that refutes the atheist by demonstrating that God is, and is the creator of the heavens and the earth and all things visible and invisible, we must begin, as Descartes did, with thought (*cogito*), who was so far right, and ascertain what are the real and necessary elements of thought. This is no light labor, and it is a labor rendered necessary only by prevailing errors in order to refute them, otherwise there would be no necessity for it, and little utility in it; for the human mind remains and operates the same with or without the knowledge the analysis affords.

We therefore adopt the method of the psychologists so far as to begin with the analysis of thought. This is imposed on us by the necessity of the case, as it is only in thought that we find ourselves or are placed in intellectual relation with any thing not ourselves. It is only in thought that the principles either of science or reality can be ascertained. The atheist must assert thought as well as the theist, and so also must the sceptic; for he who denies or he who doubts, thinks, and can neither doubt nor deny without thinking. Hence universal denial or universal doubt, or scepticism, is simply impossible; for he who denies, or he who doubts, knows that he denies or doubts, as he who thinks knows that he thinks. The error of Descartes, or the Psychologues, is not in beginning with thought, but in their assumption that all thought is the act of the soul or subject alone, or that thought is a purely psychological fact.

Cousin, though erring on many capital points, gives somewhere a very clear and just analysis of thought, which he defines to be a complex fact, composed of three inseparable elements, subject, object, and form. He asserts that the subject is always the soul, or ourselves thinking; the object is always distinct from the soul, and standing over against it; and the form is always the relation of the subject and object. Every thought, therefore, is the synthesis of three elements: subject, object, and their relation, as we maintained and proved in some chapters of an unfinished work on Synthetic Philosophy published in the years 1842-43.

Thought is either intuitive or reflective. The careful analysis of intuitive thought, intuition, what Cousin calls spontaneity or spontaneous thought, though erroneously, and which he very properly distinguishes from reflection or thought returning on itself, and so to speak, actively rethinking itself, discloses these three elements: subject, object, and their relation, always distinct, always inseparable, given simultaneously in one and the same complex fact. Deny one or another of these elements and there is and can be no thought. Remove the subject, and there is no thought, for there evidently can be no thought where there is no thinker; remove the object, and there is equally no thought, for to think nothing is simply not to think; and finally, deny the relation of subject and object, and you also deny all thought, for certainly the soul cannot apprehend an object or an object be presented to the soul with no relation between them; hence the assertion by the peripatetics of the necessity to

the fact of intuition as well as of cognition of what they call *phantasmata* and *species intelligibiles*, which is simply their way of expressing the relation in thought of subject and object.

The three elements of thought being given simultaneously and synthetically in one and the same fact, they all three rest on the same authority and are equally certain both subjectively and objectively. Here we escape the interminable debates of philosophers as to the passage from the subjective to the objective, and, in military phrase, flank the question of the certainty of human knowledge, and thus render all arguments against either subjectivism or scepticism superfluous. There is no passage from the subjective to the objective, if the activity of the subject alone suffices for the production of thought, and no possible means of a logical refutation of scepticism. If the soul alone could suffice for thought, nothing else would be necessary to its production, and thought would and could affirm no reality beyond the soul itself; no objective reality could ever be proved, and no real science would be possible. All objective certainty would vanish, for we have and can have only thought with which to prove the objective validity of thought. Hence it is that those philosophers who regard thought as the product of the soul's activity alone, have never been able to refute the sceptic or to get beyond the sphere of the subject.

The soul's activity alone does not, and, unless it were God, who is the adequate object of his own intellect, could not, suffice for thought. The object is as necessary to the production of thought as is the subject. The soul cannot act without it, and therefore cannot seek and find its object. The presence and activity of the object is necessary to the activity of the subject. The object must then present itself or be presented to the soul, or there is no thought actual or possible. This is the fact which Cousin undertakes to explain by what he calls spontaneity, and which he distinguishes from reflection. Intuition, he says, is spontaneous, impersonal; but reflection is personal, in which the soul acts voluntarily. But unhappily he loses all the advantage of this distinction, for he makes the intuition the product of the spontaneous activity of the soul, or, as he says, the spontaneous or impersonal reason, therefore as much a psychological product as reflection itself; and therefore again, gets, even in intuition, no object, no reality, *extra animam*, and with all his endeavors he never really gets out of the subjectivism

of Kant, or even the egoism of Fichte. The distinction he makes between the personal reason and the impersonal is by no means a distinction between subject and object, but simply a distinction in the soul itself, or a distinction between its spontaneous and reflective modes of acting, and is, as Pierre Leroux has well said, a contradiction of his own assertion that the subject is always the soul, and the object is always distinguishable from it, standing over against it, and acting from the opposite direction; for the impersonal and personal reason are in his view psychical, simply a faculty of the soul.

If the object were purely passive, or did not actively concur in the production of thought, it would be as if it were not, and the soul could no more think with it than without it. It is the fact that the object actively concurs in the production of thought that establishes its reality, since what is not, or has no real existence, cannot act, cannot present or affirm itself. So far Pierre Leroux, to whom we are much indebted for this analysis of thought, is right, and proves himself, let Gioberti speak as contemptuously of him as he will, a true philosophical observer; but he vitiates all that follows in his philosophy by maintaining that the soul creates or supplies the form of the thought, or the relation between subject and object, as we have shown in *The Convert*. The soul cannot act without the object, nor unless the object is placed in relation with it; consequently the soul can no more create the relation than it can create the object or itself. The object with the relation, or the correlation of subject and object, then, is presented to the soul or given it, not created or furnished by it.

The soul, unable to think by itself alone, or in and of itself, can think even itself, find itself, or become aware of its own existence only in conjunction with the object intuitively presented; each of the three elements of thought therefore not only rests on the same authority, but each is as certain as is the fact of consciousness or the fact that we think. The object is affirmed or affirms itself objectively, and is real with all the certainty we have or can have of our own existence. Further than this, thought itself cannot go. we cannot from principles more ultimate than thought, demonstrate thought; but it is not necessary, for he who thinks knows that he thinks, and cannot deny that he thinks without thinking, and therefore not without affirming what he

denies. This is all that can be asked, for a denial that denies itself is equivalent to an affirmation.

This analysis of thought not only refutes scepticism and subjectivism, or what is called in English philosophy, idealism, and shows the objective validity of intuition to be as indisputable as our consciousness of our own existence, but it refutes at the same time and by the same blow both the ontologists and psychologists; not indeed by denying either the ontological or the psychological principle, but by showing that both are given in one and the same thought, and therefore that neither is obtained by any process of reasoning from the other. The psychologist assumes that the soul is given, and that it by its own psychical action obtains the non-psychical or ontological; the ontologist assumes that being is given, and from the notion of being alone the soul deduces both the psychical and the cosmic. Neither is the fact. Being must be intuitively presented or we cannot have the notion of being, and the intuitive presentation of being to the subject gives the subject simultaneously the consciousness of itself as the subject of the intuition. Being can be presented in thought, only under the relation of object, and in every thought is given simultaneously with the other two inseparable elements, subject and relation. The psychologist fails in his analysis of thought to detect as an original and indestructible element of thought a non-psychical element, the object which stands over against it, distinct from it, and except in conjunction with which there is and can be no psychical activity or action. What the psychologist overlooks is the fact that the psychical and the non-psychical, as the condition of the soul's activity and consciousness of itself, are both given together in one and the same intuitive fact, and therefore that neither is obtained as an element of thought or science from the other. The objective validity of our knowledge rests on the non-psychical element of thought, not on the psychical. The ontologist fails to detect the psychical element as a primitive element of thought; the psychologist fails to detect the ontological element as equally primitive and underived; and neither notes the fact that both are given in one and the same original intuition. Cousin asserts it indeed, but as we have seen, forgets it or destroys its value, by resolving the distinction of subject and object into a distinction between the personal and impersonal reason, or between the spontaneous and reflective modes of the soul's activity, which

makes both really psychical, and allows nothing *extra animam* to be affirmed in thought or presented in intuition.

VIII.—ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECT.

The analysis of thought, as we have just seen, discloses a non-psychical or an ontological element, and shows that in every thought there is an object distinct from and independent of the subject, and that in every intuitive thought the object affirms or presents itself by its own activity. This at one stroke establishes the reality of the object and the validity of our science or knowledge. Having done this, we may proceed to analyze, not the subject, as do the psychologists, but the object, in order to determine, not how we know, but what we know.

Modern philosophers, for the most part, especially since Descartes, proceed to analyze the subject before having either ascertained or analyzed the object, and are engrossed with the method and instrument of philosophy before having determined its principles. All philosophers do and must begin with a more or less perfect analysis of thought. Even Gioberti, who insists on the ontological method, concedes that in learning or teaching philosophy, we must begin with psychology, the analysis of thought, or as Cousin says, with the analysis of "the fact of consciousness." But the psychologists proceed immediately from the analysis of thought to the analysis of the subject, that is, of the soul, and give us simply the philosophy, as it may be called, of the Human Understanding, as do Locke and Hume; of the Active powers of the soul as do Reid and Stewart; or of the Human Intellect as does Dr. Porter, president of Yale College. This at best can give us, except by an inconsequence, only a science of abstractions, or the subjective forms of thought without any objective reality, or barely the *Wissenschaftslehre*, or the science of knowing, of Fichte, the science of the instrument and method of science, not science itself, the science of empty forms, not the science of things.

It is no wonder, therefore, that philosophy is very generally regarded as dealing only with abstractions and empty formulas, or that it is very generally despised and rejected by men of clear insight and strong practical sense, as an abstract science, and therefore worthless. Mere psychology,

which can be only the science of abstractions or empty forms, is even worse than worthless, and the popular estimate of it is only too favorable. There is no class of men more contemptible or mischievous than psychologists endeavoring to pass themselves off for philosophers, and very few others are to be met with in the heterodox world, or even in the orthodox world, when not guided and restrained by the principles and dogmas of Christian theology.

This comes from proceeding to the analysis of the subject before having analyzed the object. The object, if given simultaneously with the subject in the fact of thought, precedes it in the order of being or real order; for it presents or affirms itself as the necessary condition of the soul's activity, and of her apprehension of her own existence even. It is first in order, and its analysis should precede that of the soul; for as the subject is given only in conjunction with the object, or as reflected or mirrored in it, it is only as reflected or mirrored in the object that it can know or recognize its own powers or faculties. The object determines the faculty, not the faculty the object. Man, St. Thomas says, somewhere, as cited by Balme, "is not intelligible in himself, because he is not intelligence in himself." If he could know himself in himself, or be the direct object of his own intellect, he would be God, at least independent of God. The soul knows itself only under the relation of subject, as it knows what is not itself only under the relation of object, and is conscious of its own existence only in the intuition of the object. We ascertain the powers of the soul from the object she apprehends, not the reality of the object from the powers or faculties of the soul. The analysis of the object is, then, the necessary condition of the analysis of the subject.

The analysis of the object, like that of thought, if we mistake not, gives us, or discloses as essential in it, three elements, the ideal, the empirical, and the relation between them. The ideal is the *a priori* and apodictic element, without which there is and can be no intelligible object, and consequently no thought; the empirical is the fact of experience, or the object, whether appertaining to the sensible order or to the intelligible, as intellectually apprehended by the soul; the relation is the *nexus* of the ideal and the empirical, and is given by the ideal itself.

Kant has proved in his *Critik der reinen Vernunft*, or Analysis of Pure Reason, that the empirical is not possible without the ideal, or as he says, without cognitions *a priori*,

which are necessary to every synthetic judgment, or cognition *a posteriori*. The cognitions *a priori* Kant calls categories after the peripatetics, or certain forms under which we necessarily apprehend all things. He makes these forms or categories forms of the human understanding, and therefore makes them subjective, not objective, or places them on the side of the subject, not on the side of the object. Aristotle makes them, apparently, forms neither of the subject nor of the object, but of the *mundus logicus*, or a world intermediary between the subject and the object, or the soul and the *mundus physicus*, or real world. Kant's doctrine, that the categories are forms of the subject, is refuted in our analysis of thought. It implies that the subject can exist and operate without the object, and that we see the object as we do, not because it is such as we see it, but because such is the constitution or law of the human mind,—which denies the objective validity of our knowledge already established.

The peripatetic categories are admissible or not, as the intermediary world is or is not taken as the representation of the real world. If we take the phantasms and intelligible species as the representations of the object to the mind, not by the mind, and thus make the categories real, not simply formal, the peripatetic doctrine, as will be seen further on, is not inadmissible. But if we distinguish the categories from the *mundus physicus* or real world, and make them forms of an intermediary world, or something which is neither subject nor object, we deny them all reality, for no such world does or can exist. What is neither subject nor object is nothing. St. Thomas, as we understand him, makes, as we shall by and by show, the phantasms and species proceed from the object, and holds them to be in the reflective order, in which the soul is active, representative of the object; which permits us to hold that in the intuitive order they are simply presentative or the object presenting or affirming itself to the passive intellect. He holds them to be, in scholastic language, *objectum quo* not *objectum quod* or that in which the intellect terminates, but that by which it attains to the idea, or the intelligible, as will be more fully explained further on. The modern peripatetics, for the most part, make the categories purely formal, and gravely tell us that a proposition may be logically true and yet really false!

Cousin identifies the categories of Aristotle and Kant, with what he calls necessary and absolute ideas, and reduces their number to being and phenomenon, or substance

and cause, but loses their objective reality by making them constituent elements of the impersonal reason, which is subjective, as purely so as is the reflective reason itself. The impersonal reason differs, in his philosophy, from the personal reason only as to the mode of its activity, and is, as the personal, a faculty of the soul, by which the soul knows all that it does or can know, whatever the degree or region of its knowledge.

Dr. Ward, of the *Dublin Review*, places or intends to place the categories or, as he says, necessary and eternal ideas, on the side of the object, and holds that they are intuitive or self-evident; yet he makes intuition the act of the soul, therefore, empirical, and really places the ideal on the side of the subject. He fails to integrate them in real and necessary being, and says, after Father Kleutgen, that though founded on God, they are not God. But what is founded on God, and yet is not God, is creature, and creatures Dr. Ward cannot hold them to be, for he holds them to be necessary and eternal, and necessary and eternal creature is a contradiction in terms. What is neither God nor creature is nothing, and Dr. Ward cannot say ideas are nothing, for he holds them to be intuitive or self-evident, and nothing cannot evidence itself, or be an object of intuition. There is, also, a further difficulty. Dr. Ward, as do Drs. McCosh, Porter, Hopkins, and others of the same school, by making intuition an act of the soul makes it a fact of experience, and the point to be met is, that without intuition of the ideal, there is and can be no fact of experience, or empirical intuition. It must be borne in mind that Kant has proved that without the *cognitions a priori*, or what we call the ideal, no cognition *a posteriori* is possible.

Dr. Newman, of whom we would always speak with profound reverence, in his *Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent*, apparently at least, not only denies ideal intuition, but the objective reality of the ideal itself, and resolves the categories or ideas into pure mental abstractions created by the mind itself. "All things of the exterior [objective?] world," he says, section second of his opening chapter, "are unit and individual, and nothing else; but the mind not only contemplates these unit realities as they exist, but has the gift, by an *act of creation*, to bring before it abstractions and generalizations which have no existence, no counterpart out of it." It would be difficult to express more distinctly the Nominalism of Rosceline, or at least the Con-

ceptualism of Abelard, censured by the theologians of the twelfth century as incompatible with the assertion of the ineffable mystery of the Ever-Blessed Trinity. It need not surprise us, therefore, that Dr. Newman confesses in his *Apologia pro Vita sua*, that he has never been able by reasoning to prove satisfactorily to his own mind the existence of God, for on his philosophy, if we do not misapprehend it, he can adduce no argument against the atheist. If we are to take the passage cited as a key to his philosophy, there can be for him no object in thought but these unit realities, for the abstractions and generalizations, being mental creations, are all on the side of the subject, and no place is left for God in the knowable.

But, unhappily, these "unit realities" are not cognizable by themselves alone. To suffice of themselves as objects of thought they must suffice for their own existence. What cannot exist alone, cannot be known alone. Then every one of these unit realities, to be cognizable alone, must be an independent, self-existent, and self-sufficing being, that is to say, God, and there must be as many Gods as there are unit realities or distinct objects of thought or intuition, which we need not say is inadmissible. These unit realities can be objects of thought or intuition only on condition of presenting or affirming themselves to the mind, and they can present or affirm themselves in intuition only as they are *in re*, not as they are not, as is sufficiently proved in our analysis of thought. If they are not real and necessary being they cannot affirm themselves as such; if they are not such they can affirm themselves only as contingent and dependent existences that have their being in another, not in themselves, and then only under the relation of contingency or dependence, or in relation to that on which they depend; consequently they are not cognizable without intuition of real and necessary or independent being which creates them. Contingency or dependence expresses a relation, but relations are cogitable only in the related, and only when both terms of the relation are given. Neither term can be inferred from the other, for neither can be thought without the other. Hence there is no intuition of the contingent without intuition of the necessary, or empirical intuition without ideal intuition.

The categories are all correlatives, and are presented in two lines, as one and many, the same and the diverse, the universal and the particular, the infinite and the finite, the

immutable and the mutable, the permanent and the transitory, the perfect and the imperfect, the necessary and the contingent, substance and phenomena, being and existences, cause and effect, &c. These severally connote each other, and we cannot think the one line without thinking or having intuition of the other. When we think a thing as particular, we distinguish it from the universal, or think it as *not* universal; but evidently we cannot do this unless the universal is intuitively present to the mind. The same is equally true of every one of the other categories. The contingent is not cogitable without intuition of the necessary; nor is it possible to think the contingent without intuition of its contingency, for, as we have shown in the foregoing analysis, the object presents itself by its own activity, and therefore must present itself as it is, not as it is not. Nothing is more certain than that the relation of the categories is no fact of experience, nor than that neither correlative is inferred from the other. Yet it is no less certain that men, all men, even very young children, regard Dr. Newman's "Unit realities" as contingent, as dependent, or as not having the cause of their existence in themselves. Hence the questions of the child to its mother: "Who made the flowers? who made the trees? who made the birds? who made the stars? who made father? who made God?" Hence, too, those anxious questionings of the soul that we mark in the ancient heathen and in the modern Protestant world: Whence came we? why are we here? whither do we go? It is only scientists, Comtists or Cosmists, who are satisfied with Topsy's theory, "I didn't come, I grow'd." But if the soul had no intuition of the relation of contingent and necessary, or of cause and effect, it would and could ask no such questions.

It is certain, as a matter of fact, that the soul has present to it both the contingent and necessary, as the condition *a priori* of all experience or empirical intuition. So much Kant has proved. The object of thought always presents itself either as contingent or as necessary. The categories of necessity and contingency, not being empirical, since they are the forms under which we necessarily apprehend every object we do apprehend, we call them ideas, or the ideal. The question to be settled is, Is the ideal, without which no fact of experience is possible, on the side of the object, or on the side of the subject? Kant places it on the side of the subject, and subjects the object to the laws of the soul;

we place it on the side of the object, and hold that it is that without which the object is not intelligible, and therefore no object at all. Hence we maintain that the object of thought is not a simple unit, but consists of three inseparable elements, the ideal, the empirical, and their relation. The proof that we are right is furnished in our analysis of thought, and rests on the principle that what is not is not intelligible, and that no object is intelligible save as it really exists. This follows necessarily from the fact we have established that the object presents or affirms itself by its own activity. Contingent existences are active only in their relation to the necessary; consequently are intelligible or cognizable only in their relation of contingency. Then, as certain as it is that we think, so certain is it that the ideal is on the side of the object, not on the side of the subject. This will appear still more evident when we recollect that the contingent is not apprehensible without the intuition of the necessary on which it depends, and the necessary is and can be no predicate of the subject, which is contingent existence, not necessary being, since it depends on the object for its power to act.

It follows from this that the ideal is given intuitively in every thought, as an essential element of the object, and therefore that it is objective and real. But while this agrees with Plato in asserting the objective reality of the ideal, in opposition to Kant, it agrees also with Aristotle and St. Thomas in denying that it is given separately. We assert the ideal as a necessary element of the object, but we deny that, separated from the empirical element, it is or can be an object of thought; for man in this life is not pure spirit or soul, but spirit or soul united to body, and cannot directly perceive, as maintained by Plato, the old Gnostics or *Pneumatici*, the modern Transcendentalists, Pierre Leroux, and the disciples of the English School founded by the opium-eater Coleridge, such as Drs. McCosh and Ward, Presidents Marsh, Porter, and Hopkins, to mention no others. Hence we deny the proposition of the Louvain professors, improbated by the Holy See, that the mind "has immediate cognition, at least habitual, of God." Cognition or perception is an act of the soul in concurrence with the object, and the soul, though the *forma corporis*, or informing principle of the body, never in this life acts without the body, and consequently can perceive the ideal only as sensibly represented. The ideal is really given in intuition,

but not by itself alone; it is given in the empirical fact as its *a priori* condition, and is distinctly held only as separated from it, by reflection, the *intellectus agens*, or active intellect, as maintained by St. Thomas and the whole peripatetic school, as well as by the official teaching in our Catholic schools and colleges generally.

Ideal intuition is not perception or cognition. Perception is empirical, whether mediate or immediate, and whatever its object or its sphere, and in it the soul is always the percipient agent. Intuition of the ideal is solely the act of the object, and in relation to it the intellect is passive. It corresponds to the intelligible species of the peripatetics, or rather to what they call *species impressa*. Dr. Reid, founder of the Scottish school, finished by Sir William Hamilton, thought he did a great thing when he vehemently attacked, and as he flattered himself made away with, the phantasms and intelligible species of the peripatetics, which he supposed were held to be certain ideas or immaterial images interposed between the mind and the real object, and when he asserted that we perceive things themselves, not their ideas or images. But Dr. Reid mistook a wind-mill for a giant. The peripatetics never held, as he supposed, the *phantasmata* and the *species intelligibiles* to be either ideas or images, nor denied the doctrine of the Scottish school, that we perceive things themselves; and one is a little surprised to find so able and so learned a philosopher as Gioberti virtually conceding that they did, and giving Reid and Sir William Hamilton credit for establishing the fact that we perceive directly and immediately external things themselves. We ourselves have studied the peripatetic school chiefly in the writings of St. Thomas, the greatest of the Schoolmen, and we accept the doctrine of sensible and intelligible species as he represents them, that is, supposing we ourselves understand him. Both the sensible and the intelligible species proceed from the object, and in relation to them the intellect is passive, that is, simply *in potentia ad actum*. Now, as we have shown that the intellect cannot act prior to the presentation of the object or till the object is placed in relation with it, it cannot then, either in the sensible or the intelligible order, place itself in relation with the object, but the object, by an objective act independent of the intellect, must place itself in relation with the subject. This is the fact that underlies the doctrine of the peripatetic phantasms and intelligible species, and trans-

lated into modern thought means all simply what we call ideal intuition, or the presentation or affirmation of the object by itself or its placing itself by its own act in relation to the intellect as the *a priori* condition of perception.

But as the soul cannot act without the body, the intelligible cannot be presented save as sensibly represented, and therefore only in the phantasmata or sensible species, from which the active intellect abstracts, divides, disengages, or separates—not infers—them. Yet the intelligible, the ideal, as we say, is really presented, and is the object in which the intellect terminates or which it attains, the very doctrine we are endeavoring by our analysis of the object to bring out. Reid never understood it, and psychologists either do not distinguish the ideal from the empirical, or profess to infer it by way of deduction or induction from the sensible. St. Thomas does neither, for he holds that the intelligible enters the mind with or in the sensible, and is simply disengaged, not concluded, from it.

It is necessary to be on our guard against confounding the question of the reality of the ideal or universal and necessary ideas, which correspond to the cognitions *a priori* of Kant, with the scholastic question as to the reality of universals, as do the Louvain professors, in the proposition improbated by the Holy See, that universals, *a parte rei considerata*, are indistinguishable from God, which confounds universals with *idea exemplaris*, or the type in the divine mind after which God creates, and which St. Thomas says is nothing else than the essence of God. *Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei*. The universals of the Schoolmen are divisible into classes: 1, Whiteness, roundness, and the like, to which some think Plato gave reality, as he did to justice, the beautiful, &c., and which are manifestly abstractions, with no reality save in their concretes from which the mind abstracts them; 2, Genera and species, as *humanitas*. The Scholastics, as far as our study of them goes, do not sharply distinguish between these two classes, but treat them both under the general head of universals.

Rosceline and the Nominalists, who fell under ecclesiastical censure, held universals to be simply general terms, or empty words; Abelard and the Conceptualists held them to be not empty words, but mental conceptions existing in the mind but with no existence *a parte rei*; Guillaume de Champeaux of St. Victor, and afterwards bishop of Paris, and the mediæval Realists, are said to have held them to be real or

to exist *a parte rei*, or as they said then, as separate entities ; St. Thomas and the Thomists, as is well known, held them to exist *in mente* or *in conceptu cum fundamento in re*. But Cousin, in his *Philosophie Scholastique*, originally published as a Report to the French Academy on the unpublished works of Abelard, thinks, not without reason, that he finds in a passage cited by Abelard from William de Champeaux, that the mediæval realists did not assert the separate entity of all universals, but only the reality of genera and species, though of course, not either as ideas in the divine mind, or as existing apart from their individualization.

The reality of genera and species is very plainly taught in Genesis, for it is there asserted that God created all living creatures each after its kind ; and if we were to deny it, generation as the production of like by like could not be asserted ; the dogma of Original Sin, or that all men or the race sinned in Adam, would be something more than an inexplicable mystery, and we have observed that those theologians who deny the reality of the species, have a strong tendency to deny original sin, or to explain it away so as to make it not sin, but the punishment of sin. Certainly, if the race were not one and real in Adam, it would be somewhat difficult to explain how original sin could be propagated by natural generation. It would be equally difficult to explain the mystery of Redemption through the assumption of human nature by the Word, unless we suppose, what is not admissible, that the Word assumed each individual man, for to suppose a real human nature common to all men, is to assert the reality of the genus or species. The denial of the reality of genera and species not only denies the unity of the race and thus denies Original Sin, the Incarnation, Redemption, and Regeneration, but also impugns, it seems to us, the Mystery of the Blessed Trinity, by denying the unity of the nature or essence of the three persons of the Godhead, and certain it is that both Rosceline and Abelard were accused of denying or misrepresenting that ineffable Mystery.

We are not aware of the views of St. Thomas on this precise question, or that he has treated specially of the question of genera and species. As to the other class of universals, he is unquestionably right. They are conceptions, existing *in mente cum fundamento in re*, that is, mental abstractions, formed by the mind operating on the concretes given in intuition. They have their foundation in reality. There

is a basis of reality in all our mental conceptions, even in our wildest imaginations and our most whimsical fancies, for we neither think nor imagine what is absolutely unreal.

But however this may be, St. Thomas* does not class what we call the ideal intuitively given, with the universals or conceptions, with simply a basis in reality. He asserts self-evident principles, the first principles of science or of demonstration, which are neither formed by the mind, nor obtained from experience, but precede experience and all reasoning, and which must be given by ideal intuition. In its substance, its principles and method, the real philosopher will find that the philosophy of St. Thomas cannot be safely rejected, although, as we have already intimated, he may find it necessary, in order to meet errors which have arisen since his time, to explain some questions more fully than St. Thomas has done and to prove some points which he could take for granted.

IX. ANALYSIS OF THE IDEAL.

The analysis of Thought gives us three inseparable elements, all equally real : subject, object, and their relation ; the analysis of the Object gives us also three inseparable elements, all objectively real, namely, the ideal, the empirical, and their relation. The analysis of the Ideal, we shall see, gives us again three inseparable elements, all also objectively real, namely, the necessary, the contingent, and their relation, or being, existences, and the relation between them.

We have found what logicians call the categories and what we call the ideal or objective ideas, and without which no thought or fact of experience, as Kant has proved, is possible, are identical. Aristotle makes the categories ten and two predicaments ; Kant makes them fifteen, two of the sensibility, twelve of the understanding (*Verstand*), and one of the reason, (*Vernunft*) ; but whatever their number, they are, contrary to Kant, intuitive, and therefore objectively real. They are intuitive because they are the necessary conditions *a priori* of experience or the soul's intellectual action ; and they are objective, since otherwise they could not be intuitive, for intuition is the act of the object, not of the subject.

* See *Summa*, p. 1, Q. 2, a. 1.

All philosophers agree that whatever exists is arranged under some one or all of these categories, and is either necessary or contingent, independent or dependent, one or many, the same or the diverse, universal or particular, invariable or variable, immutable or mutable, permanent or transitory, infinite or finite, eternal or temporary, being or existences, cause or effect, creator or creature. They are, as we have seen, in two lines, and go, so to speak, in pairs, and are cor-relatives, and each connotes the other.

But these categories may be reduced to a smaller number. Cousin contends that all the categories of the upper line may be reduced to the single category of being, and those of the lower line to the single category of phenomenon, or the two lines to substance and cause. Rosmini reduces the categories of the upper line to being in general; Father Rothenflue reduces them all to the single category of *ens reale*, or real being, in contradistinction from the *ens in genere* of Rosmini; the Louvain professors, as all exclusive ontologists, do the same. The exclusive psychologists reduce them all to the category of the soul or our personal existence; Gioberti reduces the categories of the upper line to that of real and necessary being, *ens necessarium et reale*, and all the categories of the lower line to that of contingent existences, or briefly, both lines to Being and Existences.

Cousin's reduction is inadmissible, for it omits the second line, or denies its reality. Phenomenon, in so far as real or any thing, is identical with being, and does not constitute a distinct category. Cousin makes being and substance identical, a pantheistic error; for though all being is substance, all substances are not real and necessary being. He also places cause in the lower line, which is a mistake. The effect is in the second line, but not the cause. It is true, cause is not in the upper line, for it is not eternal and necessary. The causative power is in being, and therefore in the upper line, but actual cause is the nexus between the two lines, and is included in the relation between them, or between the necessary and the contingent. This shows that the ideal or the categories cannot be reduced to two, for that would deny all relation between them, and make them subject and predicate without the copula. Gioberti is more philosophical in reducing them to three, in his terminology, Being, existences, and their relation.

Cousin, Father Rothenflue, Professor Ubaghs, and all the

ontologists, as we shall soon show, are right in their reduction of the categories of the upper line to the single category of real and necessary being, though Cousin and Spinoza, as do all pantheists, err in making being and substance identical, and in asserting one only substance, as do the Cosmists, for this restricts the ideal to the upper line, and excludes entirely the lower line. Hence they resolve all reality into being, or substance and phenomenon, the last real only in being or substance.

Real and necessary being is independent, and can stand alone, but we found in our analysis of the object, another line of categories, the contingent, the particular, the dependent, &c., equally necessary as the *a priori* condition of experience or empirical intuition, and therefore included in the ideal element of the object, and therefore given or presented in ideal intuition. The relation between the two lines of categories, and which is really the relation, not yet considered, between the ideal and the empirical, and also given by ideal intuition, will be treated further on. Here we are considering only the two lines of categories, given together in ideal intuition. For the present we shall consider them simply as reduced to two categories, namely, the necessary and the contingent, which will soon appear to be necessary being and contingent existences. These categories are, as included either in the ideal or in the object of thought, correlatives, and neither can be inferred or concluded from the other. They do not imply one the other, but each connotes [*connotat*] the other, that is to say, neither is cognizable without the other. They who take the necessary as their principium can conclude from it only the necessary, not the contingent, and hence the pure ontologists, who attempt by logical deduction from real and necessary being alone to obtain the contingent, inevitably fall into pantheism. It is equally impossible to conclude, by logical induction, real and necessary being from the contingent. Deduction from the contingent can give only the contingent, and induction can give only a generalization, which remains always in the order of the particulars generalized. Hence those who make the contingent their principium, if consequent, inevitably fall into atheism. The error of each class arises from their incomplete analysis of the object and of its ideal element. The complete analysis of the object shows, as we have seen, that the ideal element is given intuitively, as the *a priori* condition of the empirical. The analysis of the ideal shows

that the necessary and the contingent are both given in the ideal intuition and there is no need of attempting to conclude either from the other. They are both primitive, and being intuitively given, both are and must be objectively real.

But the necessary and the contingent are abstract terms, and are real only in their concretes. There is and can be no intuition of necessary and contingent as abstractions; for as abstractions they have no objective existence, and therefore are incapable of presenting or affirming themselves in intuition, which, as we have shown, is the act of the object, not of the subject. The necessary must therefore, since we have proved it real, be real and necessary being, and intuition of it is intuition of real and necessary being. In like manner, intuition of the contingent is not intuition of contingent nothing, but of contingent being, that is, existences, the *ens secundum quid* of the Schoolmen. This is what we have proved in proving the reality of the ideal. Ideas without which no fact of knowledge is possible, and which through objective intuition enter into all our mental operations, are not, as they are too often called, abstract ideas, but real.

We have reduced, provisorily, the ideas or categories to two, necessary and contingent, which we find, in the fact that they are intuitively given, are real, and if real, then the necessary is real and necessary being, and the contingent is contingent, though real, existence. Then the analysis of the ideal or a *priori* element of human knowledge gives us being, existences, and their relation. These three terms are really given intuitively, but, as we have seen, in the fact of thought or experience, they are given as an inseparable element of the object, not as distinct or separate objects of thought, or of empirical apprehension, noetic or sensible. They are given in the empirical fact, though its a *priori* element, and the mind by its own intuitive action does not distinguish them from the empirical element of the object, or perceive them as distinct and separate objects of thought. We distinguish them only by reflection, or by the analysis of the object, which is complex, distinguishing what in the object is ideal and a *priori* from what is empirical and a *posteriori*. When we assert the necessary and contingent as ideas, the mind, again, does not perceive that the one is being and the other existence or dependent on being; the mind perceives this only in reflecting that if given they must

be objective and real, and if real, being and existence, for what is not being, or by or from being, is not real. The identity of the ideal and the real, and of the real with being and what is from being, is arrived at by reflection, and is, if you insist on it, a conclusion, but, as the logicians say, an explicative, not an illative conclusion.

But we have reduced the categories to the necessary and contingent, and found the necessary identical with real and necessary being, *ens necessarium et reale*, and the contingent identical with contingent existence, *ens secundum quid*. Being is independent, and can stand alone, and can be asserted without asserting any thing beside itself; for who says *being* says being *is*—a fact misconceived by Sir William Hamilton, when he denies that the unconditioned can be thought, because thought itself conditions it. But a contingent existence cannot be thought by itself alone, for contingency asserts a relation, and can be thought or asserted only under that relation. It would be a contradiction in terms to assert ideal intuition of the contingent as independent, self-existent, for it would not then be contingent. The contingent, as the term itself implies, has not the cause or source of its existence in itself, but is dependent on being. The relation between the two categories is the relation of dependence of the contingent on the necessary, or of contingent existences on real and necessary being. This relation we express by the word existences. The *-ex* in the word *existence* implies relation, and that the existence is derived from being, and, though distinguished from it, depends on it, or has its being in it, and not in itself.

The Scholastics apply the word *ens*, being, alike to real and necessary being and to contingent existences, to whatever is real, and also to whatever is unreal, or a mere figment of the imagination, as when they say *ens rationis*. This comes partly from the fact that the Latin language, as we find it in the Latin classics, is not rich in philosophic terms, but still more from the fact that they treat philosophy chiefly from the point of view of reflection, which is secondary, and is the action of the mind on its intuitions. Whatever can be the object of reflective thought, though the merest abstraction or the purest fiction, they call by the common name of *ens*: it may be *ens reale* or *ens possibile*, *ens necessarium* or *ens contingens*, *ens simpliciter* or *ens secundum quid*. From the Schoolmen the practice has passed into all modern languages. We think it would be more simple and convenient, and tend

to avoid confusion, to restrict as Gioberti does, being to the *ens simpliciter* of the Schoolmen, and to use the word existence, or rather existences, to avoid all ambiguity, to express whatever is from being and depends on it, and yet is distinguishable from it.

Making this change in the received terminology of philosophy, the analysis of the ideal gives us being, Existences, and the relation between them. The second term, as the lower line in the categories, must be given in the ideal intuition, for we cannot perceive existences, or empirically apprehend contingents, unless we have present to our mind the idea of contingency as the correlative of the necessary, as shown in our analysis of the object.

There remains now to be considered the third term, or the relation of the contingent to the necessary, or of existences to Being. Being and existences comprise all that is or exists. What is not real and necessary, self-existent and independent being, is either nothing or it is from being and dependent on being. Existences are, as we have seen, distinguished from being, and yet are real, for the idea of contingency is given in the objective intuition, or in the ideal element of the object. Existences are then real, not nothing, and yet are not being. Nevertheless they are, as we have seen, related to being and dependent on it. But they cannot be distinct from being, and yet dependent on being, unless produced from nothing by the creative act of being. Being alone is eternal, self-existent, and beside being there is and can be only existences created by being. Being must either create them from nothing by the sole energy of its will, or it must evolve them from itself. Not the last, for that would deny that they are distinct from being; then the first must be accepted as the only alternative. Hence the analysis of the ideal gives us being, existences, and the creative act of being as the nexus or copula that unites existences to being, or the predicate to the subject.

The ideal then has, as Gioberti truly remarks, the three terms of a complete judgment, subject, predicate, and copula, and as it is formed by the ideal, it is real, objective, formed and presented to us by being itself, presented not separately, but as the ideal element of the object. It contains a formula that excludes alike ontologism and psychologism, and gives the principium of each in its real synthesis. The intelligent reader will see, also, we trust, that it excludes alike the exaggerations of both spiritualists and sensists, and

that nothing is more ridiculous than to charge it, as we have set it forth, with atheism or pantheism, as many excellent persons have done, as they find it stated in the pages of Gioberti. It refutes, as we trust we shall soon see, both atheism and pantheism, and establishes Christian theism. Truth, if truth, is truth, let who will tell it, and it is as lawful to accept it when told by Gioberti as when told by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Cousin, Pierre Leroux, or Sir William Hamilton.

X.—ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION.

In the analysis of thought, the analysis of the object, and the analysis of the ideal we have found in each, three elements given simultaneously and inseparably. In thought: subject, object, and their relation; in the object: the ideal, the empirical, and their relation; in the ideal: the necessary or being, the contingent or existences, and their relation. But though in the last analysis we have stated the relation is the creative act, the reader will not fail to perceive that we have given only a meagre account of the relation in the analysis of thought, and still less in the analysis of the object. This has been partly because we are not setting forth a complete system of philosophy embracing all the questions of rational science, and partly because till we had reached the analysis of the ideal, the analysis, or a proper account of the relation in the other two cases, could not be given, since the relation, as we hope to show, is substantially one and the same in each of the three cases.

The analysis of the relation is not practicable in the sense of the other analyses we have made; for, as relation, it has only a single term, and prescinded from the related is simply nullity. We can analyze it only in the related, in which alone it is real. In the fact of thought we have found that the object is active, not passive as most philosophies teach; and therefore that it is the object that renders the subject active, reduces it to act, and therefore creates it. St. Thomas and, we believe, all the Scholastics, teach that in the reception of the phantasms and the intelligible species the mind is passive. That which is purely passive is as if it were not, for whatever really is or exists, is or exists *in actu*, and therefore is necessarily active. Since, then, the phan-

tasms and species proceed from the object,* it follows that the object actualizes the subject, and renders it active or *intellectus agens*. Hence the relation of object and subject in the fact of thought is the relation of cause and effect. The object actualizes or creates the subject, not the subject the object.

The relation we have found of the ideal and empirical is also the relation of cause and effect. The empirical we have found is impossible without the ideal, for it depends on it, and does not and cannot exist without it. That without which a thing does not and cannot exist, and on which it depends, is its cause. The ideal then causes, produces, or creates the empirical, and therefore the relation between them is the relation of cause and effect. Ideal space produces empirical space, and ideal time produces empirical time. As the ideal is real and necessary being, *ens necessarium et reale*, as we have seen, ideal space is and can be only the power of being to externize its own acts, in the order of coëxistences, and ideal time can only be the power of being to externize its own acts successively, or progressively. Empirical space is the effect of the exercise of this power producing the relation of coëxistence; empirical time is its effect in producing the relation of succession, or progressive actualization. The relations of space and time are therefore resolvable into the relation of cause and effect, the reverse of what is maintained by Hume and our modern scientists.

As all the categories of the upper line are integrated in real and necessary being, and as all the categories of the lower line are integrated in existences, so all relations must be integrated in the relation of being and existences, which is the act of being, producing, or actualizing existences, and therefore the relation of cause and effect. Hence there are

* We think it a capital mistake of some moderns to suppose, as does the very able and learned Father Dalgairns in his admirable treatise on Holy Communion, that the Scholastics held that the phantasms and species by which the mind seizes the object are furnished by the mind itself. This would make the Scholastic philosophy a pure psychologism, which it certainly is not, though it becomes so in the hands of many who profess to follow it. St. Thomas expressly makes the mind passive in their reception, and therefore must hold that they are furnished by the object, and consequently that in them or by means of them the object presents itself to the mind and actualizes it, or constitutes it *intellectus agens*. There are more who swear by St. Thomas than understand him, and not a few call themselves Thomists who are really Cartesians.

and can be no passive relations, or relations of passivity. Whatever is or exists is active, and God, who is being in its plenitude and infinity, is, as say the theologians, *actus purissimus*, most pure act. Only the active is or exists; the passive is non-existent, is nothing, and can be the subject of no predicate or relation. So virtually reasons St. Thomas in refuting the Gentile doctrine of a *materia prima* or first matter. Aristotle held that matter eternally exists, and that all things consist of this eternally existing matter and form given it by the equally eternally existing Mind or Intelligence. St. Thomas modifies this doctrine, and teaches that the reality of things, or the real thing itself, is in the form, or idea as Plato says, and consequently is not a form impressed on a preëxisting matter, but a creation from nothing; for matter without form, he maintains, is merely *in potentia ad formam*, therefore passive, therefore mere possibility, and therefore, prescinded from the creative act, simply non-existent, a pure nullity, or nothing. Even Hegel asserts as much when he makes *das reine Seyn* the equivalent of *das Nicht-Seyn*. To give activity to the passive, to give form to the possible, or to create from nothing, says one and the same thing.

St. Thomas teaches, as we have seen, that the mind in the reception of the phantasms and species is passive, and therefore must hold, if consistent with himself, that prior to the affirmation of the object through them the mind does not actually exist; consequently that the affirmation or presentation of the object creates the mind, or the intellectual or intelligent subject, which, again, proves that the relation of subject and object is the relation of cause and effect. If then we accept the doctrine of St. Thomas, otherwise undeniable, that the passive and the possible are identical, we must deny—since the possible is non-existent, a pure abstraction, and therefore, simply nothing—that there are or can be any passive relations, and hold that in all relations, ideal or empirical, the one term of the relation is the cause of the other. This is why one term of the relation cannot be known without intuition of the other, or why, as we say, correlatives connote one another.

Here, too, we may see yet more clearly than we have already seen, the error of Sir William Hamilton in asserting that correlatives are reciprocal, and the still more glaring error of Cousin in asserting the same thing of cause and effect. Correlatives connote each other, it is true; but not

as reciprocal, for in the intuition they are affirmed, and in cognition connoted, the one as creating or producing the other, and it would be absurd to assert that the effect creates the cause, or that cause and effect produce reciprocally each the other. Sir William Hamilton is misled by his failure to comprehend that all relations are integrated in the relation of being and existences, and are therefore relations of cause and effect, or of the productive or creative power of being producing existences. He, as does Hume, excludes the notion or conception of power, and therefore not only the creative act of being, but of all activity, and conceives all relations as passive. They are all resolvable into relations of coëxistence and succession, or relations of space and time, and therefore relations of the passive; for excluding ontology from the region of science, or the cogitable, Sir W. Hamilton can assert no creative or productive power, and recognize no relation of real cause and effect.

Neither Cousin nor Sir William Hamilton ever understood that the object affirmed in thought, and without which there is and can be no thought, actualizes, that is, places or creates the subject, and renders it thinking or cognitive subject. The object does not simply furnish the occasion or necessary condition to the subject for the exercise of a power or faculty it already possesses, but creates the mind itself, and gives it its faculty, as we have already proved in proving that in ideal intuition the soul is passive, that is—as St. Thomas implies in resolving the passive into the possible—non-existent, and therefore the subject of no relation or predicate. The ideal or intuitive object must then be real and necessary being, for the contingent is not creative, and hence the intuition of being, which Sir William Hamilton denies, is not only necessary to the eliciting of this or that particular thought, but to the very existence of the soul as intelligent subject, and therefore must be a persistent fact, as will be more fully explained in the section on EXISTENCES.

It follows from this that the relation of subject and object, or rather of object and subject, in every thought is the relation, as we have said, of cause and effect. It is the third term or copula in the ideal judgment, and is in every judgment, whether ideal or empirical, that which makes it a judgment or affirmation. Being, Gioberti says, contains a complete judgment in itself, for it is equivalent to *being is*; but this is nothing to our present purpose. Being and exist-

ences as subject and predicate constitute no judgment without the copula that joins the predicate to the subject. As the copula can proceed only from being, or the subject of the predicate, as its act, the ideal judgment is necessarily *Ens creat existentias*; and, as the object creates or produces the predicate, the judgment in its three terms is Divine and apodictic, the necessary and apodictic ground of every human or empirical judgment, without intuition of which the human mind can neither judge nor exist.

It is not pretended of course that all judgments are ideal, any more than it is that every cause is first cause. There are second causes, and consequently second or secondary, that is, empirical judgments. The second cause depends on the first cause which is the cause of all causes; so the empirical judgment depends on the ideal or Divine judgment which it copies or imitates, as the second cause always copies or imitates in its own manner and degree the first cause. There is no judgment—and every thought is a judgment—without the creative act of being creating the mind and furnishing it the light by which it sees and knows; yet, the immediate relation in empirical judgments, that is, judgments which the soul herself forms, though a relation of cause and effect, is not the relation between being and existences, as we once thought, though perhaps erroneously, that Gioberti maintained, and which were sheer pantheism, inasmuch as it would deny the existence of second causes, and make God the sole and universal actor. The relation in the ideal judgment is only *eminently* the cause in the empirical judgment, in the sense in which being is the eminent cause of all actions, in that it is the cause of all causes.

The copula or relation in the ideal judgment is the creative act of being, or subject creating the predicate, as we shall soon prove, and uniting it to itself. This is true of all relations. The first term of the relation of subject and predicate, is the cause of the second term, and by its own causative act unites the predicate to itself as its subject. Second causes have, in relation to the first cause, the relation of dependence, are produced by it, are its effects or predicates; but in relation to their own effects, they are efficient causes, and represent creative being. We are existences and wholly dependent on real and necessary being, for our existence and our powers are simply the effect of the divine creative act or activity; but in relation to our own acts we are cause; we are the subject, they are the predicate, and our act producing them

is the copula. In this sense the second cause copies the first cause, and the empirical judgment copies the ideal or, as we have called it, the Divine judgment.

We say this not by way of proof that the relation between being and existence is the creative act of being, which follows necessarily from the reduction of the categories to being, existences, and their relation, or subject, predicate, and copula, for the copula can be nothing else than the creative act of being; but to prevent the mistake of supposing that being is the agent that acts in our acts, and that our acts are predicates of the Divine activity; which is the mistake into which the Duke of Argyll falls in his "Reign of Law," and of all who impugn Free Will, and deny the reality of second causes. Having done this, and having resolved the relation of being and existences, and all relations into the relation of cause and effect, we may now proceed to consider the Fact of Creation.

XI.—THE FACT OF CREATION.

The great Gentile apostasy from the Patriarchial religion originated in the loss of the primitive tradition of the fact of creation: that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth, and all things visible and invisible. No Gentile philosophy, known to us, recognizes the fact of creation; and the mother-error of all Gentilism is pantheism, and pantheism is no vulgar error, originating with the ignorant and unlettered many, but the error of the cultivated few, philosophers and scientists, who, by their refinements and subtle speculations on the relation of cause and effect, first obscure in their own minds and then wholly obliterate from them the fact of creation.

Dr. Döllinger, in his *Heathenism before Christianity*, assumes that heathenism originated with the ignorant and vulgar, not with the learned and scientific. But this view cannot be accepted by any one who has watched the course of philosophy and the sciences for the last three centuries. Three centuries ago Christian theism was held universally by all ranks and conditions of civilized society, and atheism was regarded with horror, and hardly dared show its head; now, the most esteemed, the most distinguished philosophers and scientists, like Emerson, Herbert Spencer, Professor Huxley, Emile Littré, Claude Bernard, Voigt, Bachmann,

Sir John Lubbock, and Professor Tyndall, to mention no others, are decided pantheists, and undisguised atheists. They are not merely tolerated, but are held to be the great men and shining lights of the age. Pantheism—atheism—in our times originates with philosophers and scientists and descends to the people, and, in the absence of all proof to the contrary, it is fair to presume that it was the same in ancient times. The corruption, alike of language and of doctrine, is always the work of philosophers and of the learned or the half-learned, never of the people.

The various heathen mythologies never originated, and never could have originated, with the ignorant multitude, or with savage and barbarous tribes. These mythologies are in great part taken up with the generation or genealogy of the gods, and bear internal evidence that they had for their starting point the ineffable mystery of the Blessed Trinity, and have grown out of efforts by philosophers and theologians to symbolize the eternal generation of the Son, and the procession of the Holy Ghost, which they obscured and lost by their inappropriate symbols, figures, and allegories. They all treat the universe as generated by the gods, and for cosmogony give us theogony.

Generation is simply explication or development, and the generated is of the same nature with the generator, as the Church maintains in defining the Son to be consubstantial with the Father. Hence the visible universe, as well as the invisible forces of nature, as generated by the gods, was held to be divine, both as a whole and in all its parts. Rivers and brooks, hills and valleys, groves and fountains, the ocean and the earth, mountains and plains, the winds and the waves, storms and tempests, thunder and lightning, the sun, moon, and stars; the elements, fire, air, water, and earth; the generative forces of nature, vegetable, animal, and human, were all counted divine, and held to be proper objects of worship. Hence the fearful and abominable superstitions that oppressed and still oppress heathen nations and tribes, the horrid, cruel, filthy, and obscene rites which it were a shame even to name. These rites and superstitions follow too logically from the assumed origin of all things visible and invisible in generation or emanation, to have originated with the unlearned and vulgar, or not to have been the work of philosophers and theologians.

Dr. Döllinger holds that polytheism in polytheistic nations and tribes precedes monotheism, or the worship of one God,

and denies that pantheism is the primal error of Gentilism. He appears to hold that the nations that apostatized, after the confusion of tongues at Babel, fell at once into the lowest forms of African fetichism, and from that worked their way up, step by step, to polished Greek and Roman polytheism, and thence to Jewish and Christian monotheism. But this is contrary to the natural law of deterioration. Men by supernatural grace may be elevated from the lowest grade to the highest at a single bound, but no man falls at once from the highest virtue to the lowest depth of vice or crime, or from the sublimest truth to the lowest and most degrading form of error. African fetichism is the last stage, not the first, of polytheism. The first error is always that which lies nearest to the truth, and that demands the least apparent departure from orthodoxy, or men's previous beliefs. We know, historically, that the race began in the patriarchal religion, in what we call Christian theism, and pantheism is the error that lies nearest, and that which most easily seduces the mind trained in Christian theism.

What deceives Dr. Döllinger and others is that they attribute the manifest superiority of Greek and Roman polytheism over African fetichism to a gradual amelioration of the nations that embraced it; but history presents us no such amelioration. The Homeric religion departs less from the patriarchal religion than the polytheism of any later period in the history of either pagan Greece or Rome. The superiority of Greek and Roman polytheism is due primarily to the fact that it retained more of the primitive tradition, and the apparent amelioration was due to the more general initiation, as time went on, into the Eleusinian and other mysteries, in which the earlier traditions were preserved, and, after Alexander the Great, to more familiar acquaintance with the tradition of the East, especially the Jews. The mysteries were instituted after the great Gentile Apostasy, but from all that is possible now to ascertain of them, they preserved, not indeed the primitive traditions of the race, but the earliest traditions of the nations that apostatized. Certain it is, if the Unity of God was taught in them, as seems not improbable, we have no reason to suppose that they preserved the tradition of the one God the creator of the heavens and the earth. Neither in the mysteries nor in the popular mythologies, neither with the Greeks nor the Romans, the Syrians nor Assyrians, neither with the Egyptians nor the Indians, neither with the Persians nor the Chinese, neither with the

Kelts nor the Teutons do we find any reminiscences of the creative act, or fact of creation from nothing.

The oldest of the Vedas speak of God as spirit, recognize most of his essential attributes, and ascribe to him apparently moral qualities, but we find no recognition of him as Creator. Socrates, as does Plato, dwells on the justice of the Divinity, but neither recognizes God the Creator. Père Gratry contends indeed, in his *Connaissance de Dieu*, that Moses, Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Bossuet, Fénelon, in fact all philosophers of the first rank of all ages and nations, agree in asserting substantially one and the same theodiciæa. Yet Plato asserts no God the Creator, at best, only an intelligent artificer or architect, doing the best he can with preëxisting material. His theology is well summed up by Virgil in his *Æneid* :

Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus,
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.

Artistotle asserts God as the *anima mundi*, or soul of the world, followed by Spinoza in his *Natura Naturans*, and which Pope versifies in his shallow *Essay on Man*.

All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul;
That, changed through all, and yet in all the same,
Great in the earth as in the ethereal frame;
Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glowes in the stars, and blossoms in the trees;
Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent, &c.

Here is no creative God; there is only the *anima mundi* of the Brahmins, and of the best of the pagan philosophers.

Even some Christian philosophers, while they hold the fact of creation certain from revelation, deny its probability by reason. St. Paul says "*by faith* we understand the world was framed by word of God," but St. Thomas, if we are not mistaken, teaches that the same truth may be at once a matter of revelation or faith and a truth cognizable by natural reason and matter of science, and certain it is that our greatest theologians undertake to prove the fact of creation from reason or reasoning, or from data supplied by the natural light of the soul, for they all attempt a rational refutation of pantheism.

The analysis of the ideal element of the object in thought, we have seen, shows that it is resolvable into being, existences, and their relation, and the analysis of the relation, real only in the related, brings us, so to speak, face to face with the Divine creative act. Real and necessary being can exist without creating, for it is, as say the theologians, *actus purissimus*, therefore in itself *ens perfectissimum*, and is not obliged to go out of itself, in order either to be or to perfect or complete itself, in which respect it is the contrary of the *reine Seyn* of Hegel. It is in itself infinite Fulness, *Pleroma*, *Plenum*, while the *reine Seyn* is the Byssos of the old Gnostics, or the Void of the Buddhists, and even Hegel makes it not being, but a Becoming—*das Werden*. The being given in ideal intuition is real and necessary being, self-existent, self-sufficing, complete in itself, wanting nothing, and incapable of receiving any thing in addition to what it is, and is eternally.

Hence the ontologist, starting with being as his *principium*, can never arrive at existences, for being can be under no extrinsic or intrinsic necessity of creating. But, may not the psychologist conclude being from the intuition of existences? Not at all, because existences, not existing in and of themselves, are neither cognizable nor conceivable without the intuition of being. Yet, though being is sufficient in all respects for itself, it is cognizable by us only *mediante* its own act creating us and affirming itself as the first term or being in the ideal element of the object in thought, and therefore only in its relation to the second term, or existences. This relation under which both being and existences, the necessary and the contingent, are given, is the creative act of being, as we have seen, and therefore, as that *mediante* which both being and existences are given, is necessarily itself given in ideal intuition. It is as necessarily given in the object in every thought as either being or existences, the necessary or the contingent, and therefore is objectively as certain as either of the other two terms without which no thought is possible, and is in fact more immediately given, since it is only *mediante* the relation or creative act of being that either being or existences themselves are given, or are objectively intuitive.

But not therefore, because being is cognizable only in its relation to existences, does it follow that being itself is relation, or that all our cognitions are relative, or, as Gioberti maintains, that all truth is relative; nay, that the essence

of God, as implied in the mystery of the Holy Trinity, is in relation, in the relation of the three Persons of the God-head. The relation is given in ideal intuition as the act of real and necessary being. The relation then is extrinsic, not intrinsic, and since being is real, necessary, independent, self-existing, and self-sufficing, the creative act must be not a necessary, but a free, voluntary act on the part of being. The relation, then, is not intrinsic, but freely and voluntarily assumed.

Being is given in ideal intuition *mediante* its creative act, then as creator or *ens creans*. But as nothing extrinsic or intrinsic can oblige being, which is independent and self-sufficing, to create or to act *ad extra*, it must be a free creator, free to create or not create, as it chooses. Then being must possess free-will and intelligence, for without intelligence there can be no will, and without will no choice, no free action. Being then must be in its nature rational, and then it must be personal, for personality is the last complement of rational nature, that is, it must be a suppositum that possesses, by its nature, intelligence and free-will. Then being, real and necessary, being in its plenitude, being in itself, is—God, and creator of the heavens and the earth, and all things visible and invisible.

But, it is objected, this assumes that we have immediate intuition of being, and therefore of God, which is a proposition improbated by the Holy See. Not to our knowledge. The Holy See has improbated, if you will, the proposition that the intellect has immediate cognition, that is, perception or empirical intuition of God; but not, so far as we are informed, the proposition that we have, *mediante* its creative act, intuition of real and necessary being in the ideal element of the object in thought. The Holy See has defined against the Traditionalists, that “the existence of God can be proved with certainty by reasoning.” But will the objector tell us how we can prove the existence of God by any argument from premises that contain no intuition of the necessary, and therefore, since the necessary, save as concentered in being, is a nullity, of real and necessary being? We may have been mistaught, but our logic-master taught us that nothing can be in the conclusion, not contained, in principle at least, in the premises. If we had not ideal intuition of real and necessary being, there is no possible demonstration of the existence of God. St. Thomas finds the principle of his demonstration of the existence of God, precisely

as we have done, in the relation of cause and effect, or as we say, in the relation of being and existences; but whence does the mind come into possession of that relation, or of the ideas expressed by the terms *cause* and *effect*? St. Thomas does not tell us; he simply takes it for granted that we have them. What have we done but prove, which he does not do, by analyzing, first, thought, then the object, then the ideal, and finally the relation, that we have them, and at the same time prove that being is a free, not a necessary cause, and thus escape pantheism, which we should not do, if we made cause as ultimate as being, *Ens creans*, not simply *ens in se*, that is: *Ens* acting is the cause, and existences or creatures are the effect.

The ideal, as we have found it, does not differ, we concede, from the ideal formula of Gioberti, *Ens creat existencias*, or Being creates existences. This has been objected to as pantheistic. Nay, an eminent Jesuit Father charged us with atheism because we defended it and we answered him that to deny it would be atheism. Even distinguished professors of philosophy and learned and excellent men not unfrequently fall into a sort of routine, let their minds be cast in certain moulds, and fail to recognize their own thoughts when expressed in unfamiliar terms. We have no call to defend Gioberti, who, for aught we know, may have understood the ideal formula in a pantheistic sense, but we do not believe he did, and we know that we do not. Gioberti asserts the formula, but declares it incapable of demonstration; we think we have clearly shown, by the several analyses into which we have entered, that each term of the formula is given intuitively in the ideal element of the object; and is as certain and as undeniable as the fact of thought or our own existence, and no demonstration in any case whatever can go further. As we have found and presented the formula it is only the first verse of Genesis, or the first article of the Creed. We see not, then, how it can be charged either with atheism or pantheism.

Perhaps the suspicion arises from the use of the present tense, *creat*, or "is creating," as if it was intended to assert being as the immanent cause—the *causa essentialis*, not as the *causa efficiens*, of existences; but this is not the case with us, nor do we believe it was with Gioberti, for he seems to us to take unwearied pains to prove the contrary. We use the present tense of the verb to indicate that the creative act that calls existences from nothing is a permanent

or continuous act, that it is identically one and the same act that creates and that sustains existences, or that the act of creation and of conservation are identical, as we shall explain in the next section.

The formula is infinitely removed from pantheism, because, though given in intuition *mediante* the creative act of being, being itself is given as real and necessary, independent and self-sufficing, and therefore under no extrinsic or intrinsic necessity of creating. The creative act is, as we have seen, a free act, and it is distinguished, on the one hand, from being as the act from the actor, and on the other, from existences as the effect from the cause. There is here no place for pantheism, less indeed than in the principle of cause and effect which St. Thomas adopts as the principle of his demonstration of the existence of God. The relation of cause and effect is necessary, and if cause is placed in the category of being, creation is necessary, which is pantheism. Yet St. Thomas, the greatest of the Schoolmen, was no pantheist. We have avoided the possibility of mistake by placing the causative power in the category of being, but the exercise of the power in the category of relation, at once distinguishing and connecting being and existences.

The objector forgets, moreover, that while we have by our analysis of thought established the reality of the object, or its existence *a parte rei*, and asserted the objectivity and therefore the reality of the ideal, we have nowhere found or asserted the ideal alone as the object in thought. We have found and asserted it only as the ideal element of the object, which must in principle precede the empirical element, but it is never given separately from it, and it takes both the ideal and the empirical in their relation to constitute the object in any actual thought. The ideal and the empirical elements of the complex object are distinguished by the *intellectus agens*, or reflection, in which the soul acts, never by intuition, ideal or empirical, in either of which the action originates with the object. Most men never do distinguish them during their whole lives; even the mass of philosophers do not distinguish them, or distinguish between intuition and reflection. The peripatetics, in fact, begin with the reflective activity, and hardly touch upon the question of intuition, save in what they have to say of phantasms and species. Their principles they take from reflection, not from the analysis of thought or its object. We do not dissent from their principles or their

method, but we do not regard their principles as ultimate, and we think the field of intuition, back of reflection, needs a culture which it does not receive from them, not even from St. Thomas, still less from those routinists who profess to follow him. We do not dissent from the Thomist philosophy; we accept it fully and frankly, but not as in all respects complete. There are, in our judgment, questions that lie back of the starting-point of that philosophy, which, in order to meet the subtleties and refinements of modern pantheists or atheists, the philosopher of to-day must raise and discuss.

These questions relate to what in principle precedes the reflective action of the soul, and are solved by the distinction between intuition and reflection, and between ideal intuition and empirical intuition or perception, that is, cognition. What we explain by ideal intuition, the ancients called the dictates of reason, the dictates of nature, and assumed them to be principles inserted in the very constitution of the human mind; Descartes called them innate ideas; Reid regarded them as constituent principles of man's intellectual and moral nature; Kant, as the laws or forms of the human understanding. All these make them more or less subjective, and overlook their objectivity, and consequently, cast doubts on the reality of our knowledge. "It may be real to us, but how prove that it is not very unreal to other minds constituted differently from ours?" We have endeavored to show that these are the ideal elements of the fact of experience, and are given in objective or ideal intuition, which is the assertion to the mind by its own action of real and necessary being itself, and therefore our knowledge, as far as it goes, is universally true and apodictic, not true to our minds only.

The objection commonly raised to the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, is, not that it is not true, but that it is not the principle from which philosophy starts, but the end at which philosophy arrives. This, in one sense, if we speak of the reflective order, is true, and the philosophy most in vogue does not reach it even as its end at all. Yet by using reflection we shall find that it is given in the object of every thought, as we have shown, the first as well as the last. Ideal intuition is a real affirmation to the mind by the act of the ideal itself, but it is not perception or distinct cognition, because, as we have said, it is not given separately, but only as the ideal or *a priori* element of the object, and is never

intuitively distinguished or distinguishable from it. This is, we think, a sufficient answer to the objection, which is founded on a misapprehension of what is really meant by the assertion that the ideal formula is the principle of science and intuitively given. It is so given, but it is only by reflection that the mind distinguishes it, and is aware of possessing it.

XII.—EXISTENCES.

Having found the first term of the ideal formula to be real and necessary being, and that real and necessary being is God the creator of all things distinguishable from himself, we may henceforth drop the term being or ENS and use that of Deus or God, and proceed to consider the second term, EXISTENCES or creatures. God and creatures include all that is or exists. What is not creature and yet is, is God ; what is not God and yet exists, is creature, the product of the act of God. What is neither God nor creature is nothing. There is nothing and can be nothing that is not either the one or the other. Abstractions, prescinded from their concretes, and possibilities prescinded from the power or ability of the real, we cannot too often repeat, are nullities, and no object of intuition, either ideal or empirical. This excludes the *ens in genere*, or being in general, of Rosmini, and the *reine Seyn* of Hegel, which is also an abstraction, or merely possible being. An abstract or possible being has no power or tendency, as Hegel pretends, to become by self-evolution either a concrete or actual being. Evolution of nothing gives nothing. Hence whatever truth there may be in the details of the respective philosophies of Rosmini and Hegel, they are in their principles unreal and worthless, proceeding on the assumption that nothing can make itself something. Existences are distinguishable from being and are nothing without the creative act of God. Only that act stands between them and absolute nullity. God then does not form them from a preëxisting matter, but creates them from nothing. He does not evolve them from himself, for then they would be the Divine Being itself, and indistinguishable from it, contrary to what has already been established, namely, that they are distinguished from God as well as joined to him *mediante* his creative act. God is not a necessary but a free creator ; creatures are not then evolved

from his own being, but himself, a free creator, is necessarily distinct from and independent of them; and as without creation there is nothing but himself, it follows necessarily that he must, if he creates existences at all, create them from nothing, by the word of his power, as Christian theology teaches.

But the fact that they are creatures and distinct from the Creator proves, also, that they are substances, or substantial existences, and therefore, as philosophers say, second causes. If creatures had no substantial existence, they would be mere phenomena or appearances of the divine being or substance, and therefore could not be really distinguishable from God himself; which would be a virtual denial of the creative act and the reality of existences, and therefore of God himself; for it has been shown that there is no intuition of being save *mediante* the creative act of being, or without the intuition of existences, that is, of both terms of the relation. It would deny, what has been amply proved, that the object of intuition, whether ideal or empirical, is and must be real, because it does and must present or affirm itself, which, if unreal or mere appearance, it could not do, since the unreal has no activity and can be no object of thought, as the Cosmists themselves concede; for they hold the phenomena without the substance that appears in them are unthinkable. Moreover, the object in intuition presents or affirms itself as it is, and existences all present or affirm themselves as real, as things, as substances, as second causes, and really distinguishable from Dr. Newman's "Notional" propositions, which propose nothing, and in which nothing real is noted.

It is here where Cousin and the pantheists, who do not expressly deny creation, commit their fatal mistake. Spinoza, Cousin, and others assert one only substance, which they call God, and which the Cosmists call Nature. Hence the creative act, if recognized at all, produces only phenomena, not substantial existences, and what they call creation is only the manifestation or apparition of the one only substance. It is possible that this error comes from the definition of substance adopted by Descartes, and by Spinoza after him, namely, that which exists or can be conceived in itself, without another. This definition was intended by the Schoolmen, and possibly by Descartes also, as simply to mark the distinction between substance and mode, attribute, or accident; but, taken rigidly as it is by Spinoza, it war-

rants his doctrine, that God is the one only substance, as he is the one only being, for he alone exists *in se*. The universe and all it contains are therefore only modes or attributes of God, the only substance. The error, also, may have arisen in part from using *being* and *substance* as perfectly synonymous terms. *Ens* is *substantia*, but every *substantia* is not *ens*. Substance is any thing that can support accidents or produce effects; *Ens* is that which is, and in strictness is applicable to God alone, who gives his name to Moses as I AM; I AM THAT AM,—SUM QUI SUM. There may be, *mediante* the creative act of God, many substances or existences, but there is and can be only one being, God. All existences have their being, not in themselves, but in God *mediante* the creative act, according to what St. Paul says, “in him we live, and move, and are,” *in ipso vivimus, et movemur, et sumus*. Acts xvii, 28.

Existences are substantial, that is, active or causative in their own sphere or degree. The definition of substance by Leibnitz—though we think we have found it in some of the mediæval Doctors, as *vis activa*, corresponding to the German *kraft* and the English and French *force*, is a proper definition so far, whatever may be thought of what he adds, that it always involves effort or endeavor. In this sense existences must be substances or else they could not be given intuitively, as in our analysis of the object we have seen they are, for in intuition the object is active and presents or affirms itself. Strictly speaking, as we have seen in the analysis of relation, nothing that exists is or can be passive, for passivity is simply *in potentia ad actum*; whatever exists at all exists *in actu* and so far is necessarily *vis activa*. Existences in their principle are given intuitively, and their principle cannot be substantial and they unsubstantial. But it is necessary here to distinguish between the *substans* and the *substantia*, between that which stands under and upholds or supports existences or created substances, and the existences themselves. The *substans* is the creative act of God, and the *substantia* or existence is that which it stands under and upholds. This enables us to correct the error of the deists, who regard the cosmos, though created in the first instance and set a-going, now that it is created and constituted with its laws and forces as able to go of itself without any supercosmic support, propulsion, or direction, as a clock or watch, when once wound up and set a-going, goes of itself—till it runs down. It has now no need of God, it is suffi-

cient for itself, and God has nothing to do with it, but, if he chooses, to contemplate its operation from his supramundane height. But this old deistical race, now nearly extinct, except with our scientists, forgot that the watch or clock does not run by its own inherent force, and that it is propelled by a force in accordance with which it is constructed indeed, but which is exterior to it and independent of it. The cosmos, not having its being in itself and existing only *mediante* the creative act of being, can subsist and operate only by virtue of that act. It is only that act that draws it from nothing and that stands between all existences or creatures and nothing. Let that act cease and we should instantly sink into the nothingness we were before we were created. This proves that the act of creation and that of conservation are one and the same act, and hence it is that intuition of existences is, *ipso facto*, intuition of the creative act, without which they are nothing, and of which they are only the external terminus or product. This explains the distinction between *substans* and *substantia*, and shows why the *substans* is and must be the creative act of God. Substances rest or depend on the creative act for their very existence; it is their foundation, and they must fall through without it, though they stand under and support their own effects or productions as second causes.

The creative act, it follows, is a permanent not a transient act, and God is, so to speak, a continuous creator, and creation is a fact not merely in the past but in the present, constantly going on before our eyes. We would call God the immanent, not the transitory cause of creation, as the deist supposes, were it not that theologians have appropriated the term immanent cause in their explanation of the relation of the Father to the Son and of both Father and Son to the Holy Ghost in the ever-blessed Trinity, and if it had not been abused by Spinoza and others. Spinoza says God is the immanent not the transitory cause of the universe; but he meant by this that God is immanent in the universe as the essence or substance is the cause of the mode or attribute, that is, the *causa essentialis*, not *causa efficiens*, which is really to deny that God creates substantial existences, and to imply that he is the subject acting or causing in phenomena. God is immanent cause only in the sense that he ismanent *mediante* his creative act in the effect or existences produced from nothing by the omnipotent energy of his word, creating and sustaining them as second causes or the subject of

their own acts, not as the subject acting in them. It is what theologians call the "efficacious presence" of God in all his works. He is the *eminent* cause of the acts of all his creatures, inasmuch as he is the cause of their causality, *causa causarum*; as we explained in our analysis of Relation, but he is not the subject that acts in their acts. This shows the nearness of God to all the works of his hands, and their absolute dependence on him for all they are, all they can be, all they can do, all they have or can have. It shows simply that they are nothing, and therefore can know nothing, but by his creative act. The grossest and most palpable of all sophisms is that which makes man and nature God, or God identically man and nature. Either error originates in the failure to recognize the act of creation and the relation of existences to being as given in the ideal intuition.

The cosmists make God the substance or reality of the Cosmos, and deny that he is supercosmic; but their error is manifest now that we have shown that God is the Creator of the cosmos, and all things visible and invisible. The cosmic phenomena are not phenomena of the Divine Being, but are phenomena or manifestations of created nature, and of God only *mediante* his creative act. The cosmos, with its constitution and laws or nature, is his creature; produced from nothing and sustained by his creative act, without which it is still nothing. God then, as the creator of nature, is independent of nature, and necessarily supernatural, supercosmic, or supramundane, as the theologians teach, and as all the world, save a few philosophers, scientists, and their dupes, believe and always have believed.

God being supernatural, and the creative act by which he creates and sustains nature being a free act on his part, the theory of the rationalists and naturalists that holds him bound, hedged in, by what they call the laws of nature, is manifestly false and absurd. These laws do not bind the Creator, because he is their author. The age talks much of freedom, and is universally agitating for liberty of all sorts, but there is one liberty, without which no liberty is possible, it forgets—the liberty of God. To deny it, is to deny his existence. God is not the Fate, or inexorable Destiny, of the pagan classics, especially of the Greek dramatists. Above nature, independent of it, subject to no extrinsic or intrinsic necessity, except that of being, and of being what he is, God is free to do any thing but contradict, that is,

annihilate himself, which is the real significance of the Scholastic "principle of contradiction." He cannot be and not be; he cannot choose to be or not to be what he is, for he is real and necessary being, and being in its plenitude. He can do nothing that contradicts his own being or attributes, for they are all necessary and eternal, and hence St. Paul says, "it is impossible for God to lie." That would be to act contrary to his nature, and the Divine nature and the Divine Being are identical, and indistinguishable *in re*. It would be to contradict his very being, his own eternal, immutable, and indestructible essence, and what is called the nature of things.

Saving this, God is free to do whatever he will, for extrinsic to him and his act nothing is possible or impossible; since extrinsic to him there is simply nothing. His liberty is as universal and as indestructible as his own necessary and eternal being. He is free to create or not as he chooses, and as in his own wisdom he chooses. The creative act is therefore a free act, and as nature itself, with all its laws, is only that act considered in its effects, it is absurd to suppose that nature or its laws, which it founds and upholds, can bind him, restrict him, or in any way interfere with his absolute freedom. God cannot act contrary to his own most perfect nature or being, but nothing except his own perfection can determine his actions or his providence. Following out the ideal judgment, or considering the principles intuitively given, they are alike the principles of the natural and of the supernatural. They assert the supernatural in asserting God as creator; they assert his providence by asserting that creation and conservation are only one and the same act, and the free act, or the act of the free, uncontrolled, and unnecessitated will of God. Hence also it follows that God is free, if he chooses, to make us a supernatural revelation of his will, and to intervene supernaturally or by miracles in human or cosmic affairs. Miracles are in the same order with the fact of creation itself, and if facts, are as provable as any other facts.

XIII.—GOD AS FINAL CAUSE.

We have in the foregoing sections proved with all the certainty we have that we think or exist, the existence of God as real and necessary being, and as the free, intelligent,

voluntary, and therefore personal Creator and Upholder of the universe and all things therein visible and invisible, in accordance with the teachings of Christian theism, and the primitive and universal tradition of the race, especially of the more enlightened and progressive portion of the race. This would seem to suffice to complete our task, and to redeem our promise to refute Atheism and to prove Theism.

But we have only proved the existence of God as First Cause, and that all existences proceed from him by way of creation, in opposition to generation, emanation, evolution, or formation. We have established indeed, that the physical laws of the universe, the natural laws treated by our scientists, are from God, created by him, and subject to his will, or existing and operative only through his free creative act. But this, if we go no further, is only a speculative truth, and has no bearing on practical life. Stopping there, we might well say, with Jefferson, "What does it matter to me, whether my neighbor believes in one God, or twenty? It neither breaks my leg, nor picks my pocket." God as first cause is the physical Governor, not the moral Governor of the universe, a physical, not a moral Providence, and his laws execute themselves without the concurrence of the will of his creatures, as the lightning that rends the oak, the winds and waves that scatter and sink our richly freighted argosies, the fire that devastates our cities, respiration by the lungs, the circulation of the blood by the heart, the secretion of bile by the liver or of the gastric juice by the stomach, the growth of plants and animals, indeed all the facts or groups of facts called natural laws, studied, described, and classified by our scientists, and knowledge of which passes in our day for science, and even for philosophy. The knowledge of these facts, or groups of facts, may throw light on the laws and conditions of physical life, but it introduces us to no moral order, and throws no light on the laws and conditions of spiritual life, or the end for which we are created and exist.

The man who believes only in God as first cause differs not, practically, from the man who believes in no God at all: and it is, no doubt, owing to the fact that the age stops with God as first cause, that it is so tolerant of atheism, and that we find people who profess to believe in Christianity who yet maintain that atheism is not at all incompatible with morality—people who hold in high moral esteem men who, like Ralph Waldo Emerson, Herbert Spencer, Professors

Huxley and Tyndall, recognize no distinction between physical laws and the moral law, and assert the identity of the law of gravitation and of purity of heart. Hence the Transcendentalist rule of life: "Obey thyself," "Act out thyself," "Follow thy instincts;" and hence also the confusion of physical or sentimental love with supernatural charity, the worship of the beautiful with the worship of God, and of art with religion, so characteristic of modern literature and speculative thought. Indeed, the first step in the downward progress towards atheism, is the denial or non-recognition of the theological order.

We have proved that God is being, being in its plenitude, being itself, and being in itself; therefore that he necessarily includes in himself, in their unity and actuality, all perfection, truth, power, intelligence, wisdom, goodness, freedom, will, &c. We do not hold, with Cousin and Plato, that the beautiful is an absolute and universal idea, since the beautiful exists only for creatures endowed with sensibility and imagination, and therefore is not and cannot be absolute being or a necessary perfection of being; yet we do hold, with the Schoolmen, that *ens*, *verum*, and *bonum* are absolute and identical. Hence St. Augustine teaches that existence itself, since it participates of being, is a good, and consequently even the eternally lost are gainers by their existence, though by their own fault they have made it a source of everlasting pain. To be is always better than not to be.

That God is the final cause of creation follows necessarily from the fact that he is its free, voluntary first cause. If God were, as Cousin maintains, a necessary creator, he could act only *ad finem*, not *propter finem*, and therefore could not be asserted as the final cause of creation; but being a free creator not compelled by any extrinsic or intrinsic necessity, as he cannot be, since he is being in its plenitude, *ens perfectissimum*, he can create only for some end, and consequently only for himself, for besides himself there is and can be no end for which he can create. He is therefore the final cause of creation, as well as its first cause. Hence St. Paul tells us that "for him, and in him, and to him are all things." The conclusion is strengthened by considering that God, being all-powerful and essentially wise and good, it would contradict his own being and attributes to create without any end, or for any but a good purpose or end, and he alone

is good, for the very reason that he alone is being, and his creatures are being and good only by participation.

No doubt it may be said that God creates for the good of creatures, but he is the good as he is the being of creatures, and he can give them good only by giving them himself, for besides himself there is no good for them, since beside him there is no good at all. The end or final cause of a creature is its good, and when we say God is the final cause or end of a particular existence, we say he is that which it must seek and possess in order to attain to and possess its supreme good or beatitude. When we say God creates all things for himself, we simply mean that he creates all things for the manifestation of his own glory in the life and beatitude of his creatures. The end or final cause of an existence is in obtaining the complement or perfection of its being. It is not simply beatitude, but beatitude in God that is the end. Creation flows out from the infinite fulness of the Divine Love, which would diffuse itself in the creation and beatitude of existences, and God cannot beatify them otherwise than through their participation of his own beatitude. God, then, is the ultimate and the final cause of creation.

But why could not God create existences for progress, or for progress through infinity? That would be a contradiction in terms. Progress is motion towards an end, and where there is no end there is and can be no progress. Progress is advancing from the imperfect to the perfect, and if there is no perfect, there can be no advance towards it; if there is progress, it must finally come to an end. The doctrine of infinite or indefinite progressiveness of man, so popular in this nineteenth century, is based on the denial alike of creation and the final cause of man and the cosmos. It supposes development instead of creation, and admits only the physical laws of nature, which operate as blind and fatal forces, like what is called instinct in man and animals. Hence we have a class of scientists who seek to elevate man by improving, through wise and skilful culture, the breed. How do these men who deny God as final cause, and hold the theory of development or evolution, account for the existence of moral ideas or the universal belief in a moral law? This belief and these ideas cannot be obtained either by observation or by induction from the study of the physical laws of nature; and if we hold them to be given intuitively, we assert their reality, affirm that there is a moral order, and then, a final cause of creation.

We maintain that the soul really has intuition of God as final cause in a sense analogous to that in which we have seen it has intuition of being as first cause. St. Thomas, while he denies that God is *per se notus*, concedes* that we have intuition of him, as we have explained intuition, or a confused cognition of him as the beatitude of man. The soul, he says, naturally desires beatitude, and what it naturally desires, it naturally apprehends, though it be confusedly. In our language, the soul desires beatitude; but it cannot desire what it has no intuition of, or what is in no sense presented or affirmed to it, and since God is himself this beatitude, the soul must have some intuition of God as its good or final cause. It is true, St. Thomas says, the soul does not know explicitly that it is God that presents or affirms himself as the beatitude it desires. It does not know that it is God any more than it does when it sees a man coming without being able to distinguish whether it is Peter or some other man that is coming; yet it is as really intuition of God as final cause, as the intuition of the idea is intuition of God as real and necessary being, or as first cause. In neither case is there a distinct or explicit cognition that what is presented is God, and it comes to know that it is so only by reflection.

Certainly every soul desires happiness, supreme beatitude; and desire is more than a simple want. Desire is an affection of the will, a reaching forth of the soul towards the object desired. What a man desires he, in some degree at least, wills; but will is not a faculty that can in any degree act without light or intelligence. The soul can will only what is presented to it as good; it cannot will evil for the reason that it is evil, though it may will the lesser good instead of the greater, and a present good instead of a distant or future good; for it has the freedom of choice. Yet it is certain that the soul finds its complete satisfaction in no natural or created good. It craves an unbounded good, and will be satisfied with nothing finite. Why, but because it has an ever-present intuition that it was made for an infinite good? Why, but because God the infinite everywhere and at every instant presents or affirms himself to the soul as that alone which can fill it, or constitute its beatitude? The fact that every limited or created good is insufficient to satisfy the soul has been noted and dwelt on by philosophers,

* Sum. Theol. P. I. quæst. 2, a. 1, ad 1um.

sages, prophets, and preachers in all ages of the world, and it is the theme of the poet's wail, and the source of nearly all of life's tragedies. Yet it is inexplicable on any possible hypothesis except that of supposing the soul was made for God, and has an intuitive intimation of the secret of its destiny.

Assuming, then, the intuition of God as final cause in the desire of beatitude, the assertion of it rests on the same authority that does the assertion of the ideal as being, or being as God, and therefore, as our several analyses have proved, it is as certain as either the subject or object in the fact of thought, or as the fact that we think or exist. In fact, as we have already seen, it is included in the creative act of being as a free, voluntary act. Being cannot act freely without will, and no one can will without willing an end; and no good being without willing a good end. No really good end is possible but God himself; we may, therefore, safely and certainly conclude God is our last cause as well as our first cause, at once the beginning and end, the Alpha and the Omega of all existences, the original and end of all things.

We are now able to assert for man a moral law and to give its reason in distinction from the natural or physical laws of the scientists. The physical laws are established by God as first cause, and are the laws or created forces operative in existences in their procession, by way of creation, from God, as first cause; the moral law is established by God as final cause, and prescribes the conditions on which rational existences can return to God, without being absorbed in him, and fulfil their destiny, or attain to perfect beatitude. This completes the demonstration of Christian Theism.

If God be the first and last cause of existences, they must have, so to speak, two movements, the one by way of creation from God as their first cause, the other under the moral law, of return to him as their end, beatitude, or the perfection of their nature, and the perfect satisfaction of its wants. These two movements found two orders, which we may designate the initial and the teleological. The error of the rationalists, whether in morals or religion, is not wholly in the denial of supernatural revelation and grace, but in denying or disregarding the teleological order, and in endeavoring to find a basis for religion and morality in the initial or physical order, or, as Gioberti calls it, the order of genesis. Thus Dr. Potter, Anglican Bishop of Pennsylvania

lately deceased, in his work on the philosophy of religion, asserts that religion is a law of human nature, that is, if it means any thing, the law of his physical nature and secreted as the liver secretes bile. In like manner the ancient and modern Transcendentalists, Gnostics, or Pneumatici, who make religion and morality consist in acting out one's self, or one's instincts, place religion and morality in the initial order, and in the same category with any of the physical laws or forces of the cosmos. The modern doctrine of the correlation of forces, which denies all distinction of physical force and moral power—a fatal error—originated in the assumption of the initial order as the only real order. The creative act is not completed in the initial order, or order of natural generation, and does not end with it. Man is not completed by being born, and existences, to be fulfilled or perfected, must return to God as their final cause, in whom alone they can find their perfection as they find their origin in him as their first cause. The irrational existences, since they exist for the rational, and are not subject to a moral law, can return only in the rational. As the teleological order, as well as the initial, is founded by the creative act of God, it is equally real, and the science that denies or overlooks it, is only inchoate or initial, as in fact is all that passes under the name of science in this age of boasted scientific light and progress.

We may remark here that though we can prove by reason that God is our final cause, our beatitude, because the Supreme Beatitude, it by no means follows that the soul can attain to him and accomplish its destiny by its natural powers, without being born again, or without the assistance of supernatural revelation and grace. Our reason, properly exercised, suffices, as we have just seen, to prove the reality of the two orders, the initial and the teleological, but as God, either as First cause or as Final cause, is supercosmic or supernatural, it would seem that nature must be as unable to attain of itself to God as its end, or to perfect itself, as it is to originate or sustain itself, without the creative act. They who, while professing to believe in God as creator, yet deny the supernatural order, forget that God is supernatural, and that the creative act that founds nature with all its laws and forces, is purely supernatural. The supernatural then exists, founds nature herself, sustains it, and is absolutely independent of it, is at once its origin and end.

The supernatural is God and what he does directly and

immediately by himself ; the natural is what he does mediately through created agencies, or the operation of natural laws or second causes created by him. The creation of man and the universe is supernatural, and so, as we have seen, is their conservation, which is their continuous creation ; the growth of plants and animals, all the facts in the order of genesis, are natural, for though the order itself originates in the supernatural, the facts of the order itself are effected by virtue of natural laws, or as is said, by natural causes. Yet as God is not bound or hedged in by his laws, and as he is absolutely free and independent, there is no reason *a priori*, why he may not, if he chooses, intervene supernaturally as well as naturally in the affairs of his creatures, and if necessary to their perfection there is even a strong presumption that he will so intervene. If revelation and supernatural grace are necessary to enable us to enter the teleological order, to persevere in it, and attain to the full complement or perfection of our existence, we may reasonably conclude that the infinite love or unbounded and overflowing goodness which prompted him, so to speak, to create us, will provide them. Hence revelation, miracles, the whole order of grace, are as provable, if facts, as any other class of facts, and are in their principle, included in the ideal judgment.

XIV.—OBLIGATION OF WORSHIP.

How or in what manner God is to be worshipped, whether we are able by the light of nature to say what is the worship he demands of us, and by our natural strength to render it, or whether we need supernatural revelation and supernatural grace to enable us to worship him acceptably, are questions foreign from the purpose of the present inquiry. All that is designed here is to show that to worship God is a moral duty, enjoined by the natural law, or that the moral law obliges us to worship God in the way and manner he prescribes, whether the prescribed worship be made known to us by natural reason or only by supernatural revelation. In other words, our design is to show that morals are not separable from religion, nor religion from morals.

The question is not an idle one, and has a practical bearing, especially in our age and country, in which the tendency is to a total separation of church and state, religion and morals. The state with us disclaims all right to estab-

lish a state religion, and all obligation to recognize and support religion, or to punish offences against it, at least for the reason that they are offences against religion; and yet it claims the right to establish a state morality, to enforce it by its legislation, and to punish through its courts all offences against it. Thus the government seeks to suppress Mormonism, not as a religion indeed, but as a morality. As a religion, Mormonism is free, and in no respect repugnant to the constitution and laws of the country; but as a morality it is contrary to the state morality and is forbidden: and consequently, under the guise of suppressing it as morality, the law suppresses it, in fact, as religion. Is this distinction between religion and morality real, and does not the establishment of a state morality necessarily imply the establishment of a state religion? Are religion and morals separable, and independent of each other? A question of great moment in its bearing on political rights.

Among the Gentiles, religion and morality had no necessary connection with each other. Ethics were not religious, nor religion ethical. The Gentiles sought a basis for morality independent of the gods. Some placed its principle in pleasure. Others, and these the better sort, in justice or right, anterior and superior to the gods, and binding both gods and men. This was necessary with the Gentiles, who had forgotten the creative act, and held to a plurality of gods and goddesses whose conduct was far from being uniformly edifying, nay, was sometimes, and not unfrequently, scandalous, as we see from Plato's *Euthyphro* and the *Meditations of the Emperor*. But it does not seem to have occurred to these Gentiles that abstractions are nothing, and that justice or right, unless integrated in a real and concrete power, is a mere abstraction, and can bind neither gods nor men; and if so integrated, it is God, and is really the assertion of one God above their gods, the "God of gods," as he was called by the Hebrews.

The tendency in our age is to seek a basis outside of God for an independent morality, and we were not permitted by its editors to assert, in the *New American Cyclopaedia*, that "Atheism is incompatible with morality," and were obliged to insert "as theists say." But not only do men seek to construct a morality without God, but even a religion and a worship based on atheism, as we see in the so-called Free Religionists, and the Positivists, which goes further than the request for "the play of Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out."

Even among Christian writers on ethics we find some who, in a more or less modified form, continue the Gentile tradition, and would have us regard the moral law as independent of the will of God, and hold that things are right and obligatory not because God commands them, but that he commands them because they are right and obligatory. They distinguish between the Divine Will and the Divine Essence, and make the moral law emanate from the essence, not from the will of God. If we make the law the expression of the will of God, we deny that the distinctions of right and wrong are eternal, make them dependent on mere will and arbitrariness, and assume that God might, if he had willed, have made what is now right wrong, and what is now wrong right, which is impossible; for he can by his will no more found or alter the relations between moral good and moral evil than he can make or unmake the mathematical truths and axioms. Very true; but solely because he cannot make, unmake, or alter his own eternal and necessary being.

The moral law is the application of the eternal law in the moral government of rational existences, and the eternal law, according to St. Augustine, is the eternal will or reason of God. The moral law necessarily expresses both the reason and the will of God. There are here two questions which must not be confounded, namely, 1, What is the reason of the law? 2, Wherefore is the law obligatory on us as rational existences? The first question asks what is the reason or motive on the part of God in enacting the law, and, though that concerns him and not us, we may answer: Doubtless, it is the same reason he had for creating us, and is to be found in his infinite love and goodness. The second question asks, Why does the law oblige us? that is, why is it law for us; since a law that does not oblige is no law at all.

This last is the real ethical question. The answer is not, It is obligatory because what it enjoins is good, holy, and necessary to our perfection or beatitude. That would be a most excellent reason why we should do the things enjoined, but is no answer to the question, why are we bound to do them, and are guilty if we do not? Why is obedience to the law a duty, and disobedience a sin? It is necessary to distinguish with the theologians between the *finis operantis* and the *finis operis*, between the work one does, and the motive for which one does it. Every work that tends to realize the theological order is good, but if we do it not

from the proper motive, we are not moral or virtuous in doing it. We must have the intention of doing it in obedience to the law or will of the sovereign, who has the right to command us.

What, then, is the ground of the right of God to command us, and of our duty to obey him? The ground of both is in the creative act. God has a complete and absolute right to us, because, having made us from nothing, we are his, wholly his, and not our own. He created us from nothing, and only his creative act stands between us and nothing; he therefore owns us, and therefore we are his, body and soul, and all that we have, can do, or acquire. He is therefore our Sovereign Lord and Proprietor, with supreme and absolute dominion over us, and the absolute right, as absolute owner, to do what he will with us. His right to command is founded on his dominion, and his dominion is founded on his creative act, and we are bound to obey him, whatever he commands, because we are his creature, absolutely his, and in no sense our own.

Dr. Ward of the *Dublin Review*, in his very able work on *Nature and Grace*, objects to this doctrine, which we published in the *Review* some years ago, that it makes the obligation depend on the command, not on the intrinsic excellence, goodness, or sanctity of the thing commanded, and consequently if, *per impossibile*, we could suppose the devil created us, we might be under two contradictory obligations, one to obey the devil our creator, commanding us to do evil, and our own reason which commands us to do that which is intrinsically good. What we answered Dr. Ward at the time we have forgotten, and we are in some doubt if we seized the precise point of the objection. The objection, however, is not valid, for it assumes that if the devil were our creator, God would still exist as the intrinsically good, and as our final cause. On the absurd hypothesis that the devil creates us, this would not follow; for then the devil would be God, real and necessary being, and therefore good, consequently, there could not be the contradictory obligations supposed. The hypothesis was introduced by one of the interlocutors in the discussion, as a strong way of asserting that obedience is due to the command of our Creator because he is our creator, without reference to the intrinsic character of the command. The intrinsic nature of the command approves or commends it to our reason and judgment, but does not formally oblige. This is

the doctrine we maintained then, and which we maintain now, while Dr. Ward maintained that the command binds only by reason of its intrinsic excellence or sanctity.

We asserted that there is no distinction between the idea of God and the idea of Good. Dr. Ward justly objects to this, and we were wrong in our expression, though not in our thought. What we meant to say, and should have said to be consistent with our own doctrine is, that there is no distinction *in re* between Good and God, and therefore to ask Is God good? is absurd. Dr. Ward, we find in this work, *Nature and Grace*, asserts very properly the identity of necessary truths with being; in his recent criticism on J. Stuart Mill he denies it, and says he agrees with Fr. Kleutgen, that they are founded on being, or God, but as we have remarked in a foregoing section, what is founded on God must be God or his creature, and if his creatures, how can these truths be eternal?

Dr. Ward's objection has led us to reëxamine the doctrine that moral obligation is founded on the creative act of God, but we have seen no reason for not continuing to hold it, though we might modify some of the expressions we formerly used; and though we differ from Dr. Ward on a very essential point, we have a far greater respect for his learning and ability, as a moral philosopher, than we had before re-reading his work. He seeks to found an independent morality, not independent of the Divine Being indeed, but independent of the Divine will. In this we do not wholly differ from him, and we willingly admit that the Divine will, distinctively taken, does not make or found the right. The law expresses, as he contends, the reason of God, his intrinsic love and goodness, as is asserted in the fact that he is the final cause of creation, the supreme good, the beatitude of all rational or moral existences, and the law is imposed by him as final cause, not as first cause. But this is not the question now under discussion. Judgments of moral good may be formed, as Dr. Ward maintains, by intuition of necessary truths founded on God, or identical with his necessary and eternal being; but we are not asking how moral judgments are formed, nor what in point of fact our moral judgments are; we are simply discussing the question why the commands of God are obligatory, and we maintain that they oblige us, because they are *his* commands, and he is our absolute sovereign Lord and Proprietor, for he has made us from nothing, and we are his and not our own. Hence it follows

that we have duties but no rights before God, as asserted by that noble Christian orator and philosopher, the lamented Donoso Cortés, and that what are called the rights of man are the rights of God, and therefore sacred and inviolable, which all men, kings and kaisers, peoples and states, aristocracies and democracies, are bound to respect, protect, and defend, against whoever would invade them.

The objection to the doctrine of Dr. Ward's independent morality is that it is not true, and exacts no surrender of our wills to the Divine will. It is not true, for Dr. Ward himself cannot say that the invasion of the land of Canaan, the extermination of the people, and taking possession of it as their own by the children of Israel, can be defended on any ground except that of the express command of God, who had the sovereign right to dispose of them as he saw proper. Abraham offering or his readiness to offer up his son Isaac was justified because he trusted God, and acted in obedience to the Divine command. Yet to offer a human sacrifice without such a command, or for any other reason, would contradict all our moral judgments. If one seeks to do what the law enjoins, not because God commands it, but for the sake of popularity, success in the world, or simply to benefit himself, here or hereafter, he yields no obedience to God. He acknowledges not the Divine sovereignty. He does not say to his Maker, "Thy will, not mine be done;" he does not pray, "Thy will be done on earth as in heaven;" and, what is more to the purpose, he recognizes no personal God, follows God only as impersonal or abstract being, and fails to own or confess the truth or fact that he is God's creature, belongs to God as his Lord and Master, who has the absolute right to command him, as we have shown in showing that God is man's sole creator.

The essential principle of religion is perfect trust in God, and obedience to his sovereign will, the unconditional surrender of our wills to the will of our Creator. This is only what the moral law enjoins, for the first law of justice is to give to every one his due or his own, and we owe to God, as has been seen, all that we are, have, or can do. This shows that religion and morality in their principle are one and the same, and therefore inseparable. There is then no morality without religion, and no religion without morality. He who refuses to keep the commandments of God and to render him his due, violates the moral law no less than he does the religious law. Let us hear no more then of independent

morality, which is only an invention to save the absolute surrender of our wills to the will of God, and is inspired by a reluctance to acknowledge a master.

But this is not all. If the moral law requires our unreserved obedience to the commands of God, it requires us to honor, love, trust, and obey him in all things, and therefore to worship him in the way and manner he prescribes. If then he is pleased to make us a supernatural revelation of his will and to promulgate supernaturally a supernatural law, we are bound by the moral or natural law to obey it, when promulgated and brought to our knowledge, as unreservedly as we are to obey the natural law itself. If Christianity be, as it professes to be, the revelation of the supernatural order, a supernatural law, no man who knowingly and voluntarily rejects or refuses to accept it, fulfils the natural law, or can be accounted a moral man.

We have now, we think completed our task, and redeemed our promise to refute atheism and to demonstrate theism by reason. We have proved that being affirms itself to the soul in ideal intuition, and that being is God, free to act from intelligence and will, and therefore not an impersonal, but a personal God, Creator of heaven and earth and all things visible and invisible—the free upholder of all existences, and therefore Providence, the final cause of creation, therefore the perfection, the good, the beatitude of all rational existences. We have proved his Divine sovereignty as resting on his creative act, and the obligation of all moral existences to obey his law, and to honor and worship his Divine Majesty as he himself prescribes. We can go no further, by the light of reason, but this is far enough for our argument.

XV.—TRADITION.

We have now proved, or at least indicated the process of proving, with all the certainty we have that we think or exist, the existence of God, that he is real and necessary being, being in its plenitude, or as say the theologians, *ens perfectissimum*, self-existent and self-sufficing, independent, universal, immutable, eternal, without beginning or end, supracosmic, supernatural, free, voluntary creator of heaven and earth and all things visible and invisible : creating them from nothing, without any extrinsic or intrinsic necessity, by the free act of his will and the sole word of his power ;

the principle, medium, and end of all existences, the absolute Sovereign Proprietor, and Lord of all creatures, the Upholder and moral Governor of the universe, in whom and for whom are all things, and whom all rational existences are bound to worship as their sovereign Lord, and in returning to whom by the teleological law, they attain to their perfection, fulfil the purpose for which they exist, enter into possession of their supreme good, their supreme beatitude in God, who is the good, or beatitude itself. We have in this ascertained the ground of moral obligation, and the principle of all religion, morality, and politics. We have then proved our thesis, refuted atheism under all its forms and disguises, and positively demonstrated Christian theism.

But, though we hold the existence of God may be proved with certainty by the process we have followed or indicated, we are far from pretending or believing that it is by that process that mankind, as a matter of fact, have attained to their belief in God or knowledge of the Divine Being. We do not say that man could not, but we hold that he did not, attain to this science and belief without the direct and immediate supernatural instructions of his Maker. The race in all ages has held the belief from tradition, and philosophy has been called in only to verify or prove the traditionary teaching. Men believe before they doubt or think of proving. We doubt if, as a fact, any one ever was led to the truth by reasoning. The truth is grasped intuitively or immediately by the mind, and the reasoning comes afterwards to verify it, or to prove that it is truth. The reasoning does not originate the belief, but comes to defend or to justify it. Hence it is that no man is ever converted to a doctrine he absolutely rejects, by simple logic, however unanswerable and conclusive it may be.

Supposing the process we have indicated is a complete demonstration of the existence of God as creator and moral Governor of the universe, few men are capable of following and understanding it, even among those who have made the study of philosophy and theology the business of their lives. The greatest philosophers among the Gentiles missed it, and the scientists of our own day also miss it, and fail to recognize the fact of creation and admit no supramundane God. Even eminent theologians, as we have seen, who no more doubt the existence of God than they do their own, prove themselves utterly unable to demonstrate or prove that God

is. Dr. Newman, for instance, whose Christian faith is not to be doubted, confesses his inability to prove the existence of God from reason, and in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, if he does not sap the foundation of belief in revelation, he destroys its value, by subjecting it to the variations and imperfections of the human understanding. His *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* is an attempt to prove the relativity of all science or knowledge, that in practice we assent to the probable without ever demanding or attaining to the certain, the apodictic, and is hardly less incompatible with the existence of God than the cosmic philosophy of the school of Herbert Spencer, from which it in principle does not, as far as we can see, essentially differ.

If such men as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Herbert Spencer, Auguste Comte, Emil Littré, and John Henry Newman are unequal to the process, how can we suppose that the doctrine that God is, originated in that or any process of reasoning? Reason in the *élite* of the race may prove that God is, but how can reason, wanting the word, originate and establish it in the minds of the ignorant, uncultivated, rude, and rustic multitude? And yet it is precisely this multitude, ignorant and incapable of philosophy, who hold it with the greatest firmness and tenacity, and only philosophers, and such as are formed by them, ever doubt it. There is, no doubt, a true and useful philosophy, if one could only find it, but philosophers in all ages have been far more successful in obscuring the truth and causing doubt, than in enlightening the mind and correcting errors. Plato was little else than a sophist ridiculing and refuting sophists; and in all ages we find so-called philosophers originating and defending the grossest and absurdest errors that have ever obtained, and we find them true and just only when they accord with tradition.

Intuition, as we have shown, furnishes the principle of the demonstration or proof of the existence of God, with absolute certainty; but ideal intuition, which gives the principle of cognition, is not itself cognition, and though implicitly contained in every thought as its condition, it becomes explicit or express only as sensibly re-presented in language, and the long and tedious analytical process performed by the reflective reason. To get at the ideal formula, which expresses the matter of intuition, we have had to use reflection, and both analytical and synthetic reason-

ing. The formula is obtained explicitly only by analyzing thought, the object in thought, and the ideal element of the object, and synthetizing the results of the several analyses. It is only by this long and difficult process that one is able to assert as the intuitive synthesis, *Ens creat existentias*, or the essential principles of theistic philosophy. It is so because ideal intuition, as distinguished from empirical intuition, is not open vision of the object presented, is not the soul's cognition or judgment, but the objective or divine judgment affirmed to the soul implicitly, that is, indistinctly in every thought or empirical judgment, and must be distinguished from the empirical by the reflective or analytical activity of the soul, or, in the language of St. Thomas, abstracted or disengaged by the active intellect, *intellectus agens*, from the phantasmata and intelligible species in which it is given, before it can be explicitly apprehended by the soul, and be distinct cognition, or a human judgment, the complete *verbum mentis*.

When a false philosophy has led to the doubt or denial of God, this recurrence to ideal intuition is necessary to remove the doubt, and to make our philosophical doctrines accord with the principles of the real and the knowable; but it is evident to the veriest tyro that not even the philosopher, however he may confirm his judgment by the intuition, takes his idea that God is, immediately and directly from it; for this would imply that we have direct and immediate empirical intuition of God, which not even Plato pretended, for he held the Divine Idea is cognizable only by the *mimesis*, the image, or copy of itself, impressed on matter, as the seal on wax, whence his doctrine and that of the Scholastics, of knowledge *per ideam*, *per similitudinem*, *per formam*, or *per speciem*.

We cannot take the ideal directly from the intuition, because we are not pure spirit, but in this life spirit united to body; yet we have the idea in our minds before we can deny it, or think of seeking to demonstrate it. Hence it must be acknowledged, that though reason is competent to prove the existence of God with certainty when denied or doubted, as we think we have shown, it did not, and perhaps could not, have originated the Idea, but has taken it from tradition, and it must have been actually taught the first man by his Maker himself.

The historical fact is that man has never been abandoned by his Maker to the light and force of nature alone, or left

without any supernatural instruction, or assistance, any more than he has been left without language. The doctrine of St. Thomas is historically true, that there never has been but one revelation from God to man, and that one revelation was made in substance to our first parents, before their expulsion from the garden of Eden. This revelation is what we call tradition, and has been handed down from father to son to us. It has come down to us in two lines: in its purity and integrity from Adam through the Patriarchs to the Synagogue, and through the Synagogue to the Christian Church whence we hold it; in a corrupt, broken, and often a travestied form through Gentilism, or Heathenism. The great mistake of our times is in neglecting to study it in the orthodox line, and in studying it only in the heterodox or Gentile line of transmission, all of which we hope to prove in a succeeding work, if our life and health are spared to complete it, on revelation in opposition to prevailing rationalism.

The reader will bear in mind that we have not appealed to tradition as authority or to supply the defect of demonstration; but only to explain the origin and universality of theism, especially with the great bulk of mankind, who could never prove it by a logical process for themselves, nor understand such process when made by others. Hence we escape the error of the Traditionalists censured by the Holy See.

The error of the Traditionalists is not in asserting that men learn the existence of God from tradition or from the teaching of others, which is a fact verifiable from what we see taking place every day before our eyes; but in denying that the existence of God and the first principles of morals or necessary truth, what we call the ideal judgment, are cognizable or provable by natural reason, and in making them matters of faith, not of science, as do Dr. Thomas Reid, Sir William Hamilton, Dean Mansel, Viscount de Bonald, Bonnetty, Immanuel Kant, and others. This is inadmissible, because it builds science on faith, deprives us of all rational motives for faith, and leaves faith itself nothing to stand on. Faith, in the last analysis, rests on the veracity of God, and its formula is, *Deus est Verax*, but if we know not, as the preamble to faith, that God is, and that it is impossible for him to deceive or to be deceived, how can we assert his veracity or confide in his word? Knowing already that God is and is infinitely true, we cannot doubt his word, when we

are certain that we have it. This connects faith with reason, and makes faith, objectively at least, as certain as science, as St. Thomas asserts.

God must have infused the knowledge of himself into the soul of the first man, when he made him; for all the knowledge or science of the first man must have been infused knowledge or science, since the fact of creation upsets the Darwinian theory of development, as well as the Spencerian theory of evolution, and Adam must have been created a man in the prime of his manhood, and not, as it were, a new-born infant. What was infused science in him, becomes tradition in his posterity, but a tradition of science, not of faith or belief only. The tradition, if preserved in its purity and integrity, embodies the ideal intuition, or ideal judgment common to all men, and implicit in every thought, in language, the sensible sign of the ideal or intelligible, and which represents it to the active intellect that expresses it, renders it explicit, and therefore actual cognition.

It follows from this that the ideal judgment when represented by tradition through the medium of language, its sensible representative, is even in the simple, the rustic, the untutored in logic and philosophy, who are incapable of proving it by a logical process or even of understanding such a process, really matter of science, not of simple belief or confidence in tradition. The tradition enables them to convert, so to speak, the intuition into cognition, so that they know as really and truly that God is, and is the creator, upholder, and moral Governor of man and the universe, as does the profoundest theologian or philosopher. Hence wherever the primitive tradition is preserved in any degree, there is, if not complete knowledge of God, at least an imperfect knowledge that God is, and this knowledge, however feeble and indistinct, faint or evanescent, serves as the *point d'appui* or basis of the operations of the Christian missionary among savage and barbarous tribes for their conversion.

The tradition is not the basis of science, but is in the supersensible a necessary condition of science, and hence the value and necessity of instruction or education. The ideal judgment is, as ideal, not our judgment, but objective, Divine, intuitively presented to the soul as the condition and model of our own. We can form no judgment without it, and every judgment formed must copy or be modelled

after it. But, as we have shown, we cannot take the ideal directly from the intuition, but must take it primarily from tradition or as re-presented through the senses in language, which is really what is meant by education, or instruction. But all instruction, all education, reproduces, as far as it goes, tradition, or depends on it.

As language is the sensible representation of the idea, and the medium of tradition, the importance of St. Paul's injunction to St. Timothy, to "hold fast the form of sound words," and of maintaining tradition in its purity and integrity is apparent to the dullest mind. The corruption of either involves the corruption, mutilation, or travesty of the idea, and leads to heathenism, false theism, pantheism, atheism, demonism, as the history of the great Gentile apostasy from the patriarchal or primitive religion of mankind amply proves. As tradition of the truths or first principles of science, which are ideal not empirical, had its origin in revelation or the immediate instruction of Adam by his Maker, we cannot fail to perceive the fatal error of those who seek to divorce philosophy from revelation, and, like Descartes, to erect it into an independent science. Revelation is not the basis of philosophy, but no philosophy of any value can be constructed without it.

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